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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is limited to an appeal of Judge Medley's February 
2001 denial of the issues raised in Bennett's May 2000 motion, but does not extend to 
the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction as reflected in the Minute 
Entry of January 7, 2000, or the Rule 54(b) judgments of February 11, 2000 and 
February 28, 2000. No notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the February 
2000 judgments. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE I 
Did Bennett timely appeal the district court's dismissal of his claims against Post 
Kirby for lack of personal jurisdiction? 
The standard of review is for correctness. See DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. 
Co., 828 P.2d 520, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
ISSUE II 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Bennett's claims against Post Kirby 
because of lack of personal jurisdiction over those defendants? 
The standard of review is for correctness. See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. 
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 12, 8 P.3d 256. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("the notice of appeal... shall be filed ... within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from"). 
U.S. Const. Amend, XIV § 1 (due process clause). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Post Kirby is a California law firm. In 1990, Post Kirby was approached in 
California by Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough ("Jones Waldo") to act as local and 
co-counsel in a securities class action lawsuit pending in federal court in California. Post 
Kirby performed its duties exclusively in California, except for routine communications 
and visits with persons in Utah incidental to the California litigation. The California 
litigation was settled with court approval. However, Bennett, who had been a named 
plaintiff for that class, opted-out of the class (i.e., excluded himself from the class), and 
did not participate in that settlement. Bennett now claims that Post Kirby allegedly 
committed legal malpractice, breached fiduciary and contractual duties to Bennett, and 
made misrepresentations to the court in California in connection with the settlement. 
After the California litigation was settled, Jones Waldo learned that Bennett 
intended to sue it for malpractice and assert claims that it viewed as a collateral attack on 
the California class action settlement. After hearings in the California federal court, 
which had approved the class settlement, Post Kirby obtained (at Jones Waldo's request) 
a permanent "Bar Order" barring any collateral attack on the California class action 
settlement. The Bar Order was ultimately affirmed as valid, but given a narrower 
interpretation, by the Ninth Circuit, which permitted Bennett to raise certain claims in 
this action. Bennett claims that Post Kirby committed abuse of process and intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress by obtaining the California Bar Order, and allegedly made 
misrepresentations to the California court in connection with the Bar Order litigation. 
2 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
This statement of fact reviews the allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint 
(hereinafter "Compl.") and the Affidavit of Michael L. Kirby (hereinafter "Kirby Aff."). 
Parties 
1. Defendant Post Kirby is a San Diego, California law firm. (R. 1431 (Kirby 
Aff. *f 4).) Defendant Michael L. Kirby is a founder of Post Kirby and the sole 
shareholder of Defendant Michael L. Kirby A.P.C. - a partner in Post Kirby. (R. 1432 
(Kirby Aff. f^ 5).) Post Kirby has no offices in Utah, and none of its attorneys has ever 
been licensed to practice law in Utah. Post Kirby neither advertises nor solicits clients in 
Utah. (IcLf 6.) 
2. Plaintiff Bennett is a Utah resident. (R. 1045 (Compl. If 6).) Since 1991, 
Bennett has been an attorney. (R. 1431 (Kirby Aff. ^ 4).) 
Utah Gen-Probe Lawsuit 
3. In 1989, Bennett was a minority shareholder in Gen-Probe, Inc. ("Gen-
Probe"), a company located in Southern California. (R. 1046 (Compl. f 11).) 
4. On December 5, 1989, Bennett sued Gen-Probe and its officers and 
directors in United States District Court for the District of Utah (hereinafter the "Utah 
Gen-Probe Litigation"). (R. 1050 (Compl. ^ 30).) Bennett sought to enjoin the purchase 
of Gen-Probe by a Japanese company because, inter alia, the purchase price was 
allegedly inadequate. (R. 1047-51 (Compl. ffi[ 20-26, 30, 34).) Bennett also asserted 
derivative claims on behalf of Gen-Probe against its officers and directors, and damage 
claims on behalf of a proposed class of the minority shareholders of Gen-Probe. 
3 
(R. 1051-52 (Compl. ffl[ 30-31, 36-37).) Bennett's father, Wallace Bennett, initially 
appeared as plaintiffs counsel in the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation.1 (R. 1050 (Compl. ^ 
30).) 
5. By Retainer Agreement, dated April 18, 1990, Bennett (and others) retained 
Jones Waldo as lead counsel in the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation. (R. 1053 (Compl. ffl[ 39, 
41-46, ex. 1); see also Appellant's App. 3.) The Retainer Agreement permitted Jones 
Waldo to "retain associate counsel. . . provided associate counsel [was] retained at 
[Jones Waldo's] sole expense," and Jones Waldo expressly therein associated Bennett's 
father as counsel in the Utah matter. (Appellant's App. 3 at f 6.) 
California Gen-Probe Litigation 
6. On August 24, 1990, the Utah Gen-Probe Litigation was transferred to the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of California (hereinafter the 
"California Court"). (R. 1055 (Compl. % 50).) The Gen-Probe litigation after the transfer 
to California shall be referred to as the "California Gen-Probe Litigation." 
7. As a result of the transfer of the Gen-Probe case, Jones Waldo was required 
by California local rule to associate California counsel. (R. 1055 (Compl. f^ 52).) Jones 
Waldo contacted Post Kirby in California to act as co-counsel in the California Gen-
Probe Litigation. (R. 1434 (Kirby Aff. Tf 14).) 
8. By letter dated October 24, 1990, Post Kirby agreed to act as "co-counsel" 
in a "joint representation" with Jones Waldo of a "class" in the California Gen-Probe 
1
 Bennett's father withdrew as counsel in approximately August 1991. 
4 
Litigation (hereinafter the "Post Kirby Retention Letter"). (R. 1055, 1113 (Compl. Tf 53, 
ex. 2); see also Appellant's App. 4.) Post Kirby never signed nor agreed to become a 
party to the Retainer Agreement.2 (R. 1435 (Kirby Aff. f 16).) Bennett himself 
recognized that Post Kirby was not a party to the Retainer Agreement when he wrote to 
Jones Waldo in May 1992: 
The Firm of Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat was retained as associate 
counsel by Jones Waldo after the case began. The Kirby firm has no direct 
retainer relationship with any named plaintiff; it is Kit Burton and Jones 
Waldo who bear primary responsibility to us. 
(R. 1116 (Compl., ex. 3 n.l (italics added, underlining in original)); see also R. 383 
(Second Am. Compl. ^ 2 ("Law Firm [Jones Waldo] was the sole contracting party on 
the lawyer's side in the Retainer Agreement")(emphasis added)).) 
9. Post Kirby performed its work in the California Gen-Probe Litigation 
exclusively in California, except for routine communications, meetings, or depositions in 
Utah ancillary to the prosecution of the California action. (R. 1435-36 (Kirby Aff. fflf 17-
18).) The ancillary Utah contacts allegedly consisted of the following: 
2
 Bennett claims that the Retainer Agreement contemplated a "derivative action" against 
Gen-Probe and that the transformation of that litigation into a "class action" was 
"contrary to paragraph 14 of the Retainer Agreement." (Appellant's Br. at 11 n. 11.) 
However, Post Kirby never agreed to represent the plaintiffs in a derivative action, but 
was hired solely as co-counsel in a "class action." This alleged inconsistency between 
the scope of Post Kirby's representation in the October 1990 letter and the Retainer 
Agreement highlights that Post Kirby never agreed to be a party to or bound by the 
Retainer Agreement. 
5 
(1) Three visits to Utah to review documents and work on the Fourth Amended 
Complaint to be filed in the California Gen-Probe Litigation3 (October 17, 
1990, November 12-13, 1990, and January 15-17, 1991); 
(2) Three visits to Utah for depositions and related witness preparation in the 
California Gen-Probe Litigation4 (July 25, 1999, July 29-31, 1991, and 
August 25-27, 1991); 
(3) Three visits to Utah regarding settlement of the California Gen-Probe 
Litigation5 (December 11, 1991, February 11-14, 1992, and May 11, 1992); 
and 
(4) Written correspondence or telephone conversations between Post Kirby in 
California and others (primarily Jones Waldo) in Utah. 
(R. 1671-72; see also R. 1599-1630 (Post Kirby timesheets).) 
3
 Bennett claims that he was injured by the non-inclusion of derivative claims against 
Gen-Probe in the Fourth Amended Complaint, which was prepared with the assistance of 
Post Kirby during these Utah visits. (Appellant's Br. at 11, 47.) However, as noted 
above, Post Kirby was retained (and agreed to represent the plaintiffs) only for a class 
action so that any derivative claims found in prior complaints would have been beyond 
and outside the scope of Post Kirby's representation of the plaintiffs. 
4
 Bennett has claimed that during one of these visits at his deposition in Utah, he was 
allegedly coached by Jones Waldo to essentially lie during his deposition (which he did) 
as to his potential liability for costs, and Post Kirby "tacitly ... encourag[ed] him to 
follow [that] coaching" (although Bennett did not specifically raise this allegation in his 
appellate brief). (R. 1673.) This issue dealt with the responsibility for any of defendants' 
costs assessed against the class representatives personally at the end of the case if the 
class were unsuccessful, whereas the Retainer Agreement only provided that Jones 
Waldo would advance or pay the plaintiffs' costs or expenses during the litigation. As 
will be noted hereafter the Utah State Bar (the "Bar") specifically investigated this 
allegation and held that Jones Waldo did not suborn any perjury. (R. 1209-13, 1231-32.) 
The Bar also noted that Jones Waldo ultimately agreed to cover such costs on September 
9, 1991, several months after the depositions, but prior to the settlement in this case. 
(R. 1209-12.) Bennett claims no injury from this coaching. 
3
 Bennett has claimed that during the February 14 visit, the lawyers negligently 
"encouraged" Bennett to opt out of the settlement. (R. 1673.) 
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10. During the California Gen-Probe Litigation, the parties held three 
settlement conferences presided over by Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter of the 
California Court. (See, e.g., R. 1732.) In December 1991, a proposed class settlement 
was reached and announced in California. (R. 1061-62 (Compl. fflf 71-72).) 
11. Bennett actively opposed the proposed settlement claiming that Post Kirby 
and Jones Waldo inadequately investigated the claims. (R. 1116-22.) On August 13, 
1992, Bennett "opted out" of, and objected to, the proposed settlement through filings 
with the California Court. (R. 1048,1068 (Compl. fflf 94, 102); see also R. 1132 (opt-out 
letter).) 
12. On August 17, 1992, Jones Waldo informed Bennett that his decision to opt 
out of the proposed class settlement terminated the attorney-client relationship with 
Bennett. (R. 1068 (Compl. TJ104).) Post Kirby also informed Bennett of its withdrawal 
of any representation on his behalf. (R. 1442 (Kirby Aff. If 40).) 
13. Despite Bennett's criticisms, none of the other named plaintiffs opted out of 
the settlement. On August 26, 1992, the California Court held a "Good Faith Settlement 
Hearing" wherein it approved the class settlement, and subsequently entered a Final 
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice.6 (R. 1442 (Kirby Aff. If 41); R. 1170 (Compl. ffl[ 
6
 Magistrate Porter (who had presided over the settlement conferences) conducted the 
good faith settlement hearing. Magistrate Porter found that the "settlement is fair and 
reasonable," "there has been no collusion," "the attorneys have been very up front and 
honest with their clients and with each other," sufficient damage discovery had been 
conducted, "the attorneys involved in this case . . . were the finest attorneys [she had] 
seen, the most ethical attorneys [she had] seen, and certainly experienced in this area," 
"the attorneys appeared very concerned about each and all of the class members and class 
as a whole," the attorneys "were most professional in the face of what [she] believed to 
7 
111-12); see also Appellant's App. 13 (final judgment).) The California Court also 
entered an Order Approving Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs wherein Post Kirby was 
awarded its out-of-pocket costs and 12.15% of the settlement as attorneys fees.7 
(R. 1486-92.) 
14. The California Court retained jurisdiction over "any application . . . for a 
bar order." (R. 1482-83.) 
Bar Order Litigation 
15. In mid-1994,8 Jones Waldo learned that Bennett intended to sue it on behalf 
of the entire class for alleged legal malpractice because the settlement was allegedly 
unfair and improper. (R. 1070 (Compl. ffif 113-17); see also R. 327.) 
be difficult issues, difficult clients,. . . and insurance carriers," she could not "imagine 
any member of this class criticizing any of the attorneys in this action," and the 
"attorneys did represent their clients appropriately and ethically and acted exemplary 
throughout the settlement negotiations." (R. 1465-67.) She concluded by stating that 
based on confidential information learned from both parties during the settlement 
negotiations, she believed "that this is an outstanding settlement, and I believe that it is a 
reasonable settlement for both sides of this litigation, and I congratulate all of you." 
(R. 1467-69 (emphasis added).) 
7
 Both the Retainer Agreement and Post Kirby's Retention Letter recognized that 
attorneys fees would be determined by the California Court for any recovery on behalf of 
a class (rather than on the basis of any agreement between the parties). (Appellant's App. 
3 Tf 2; id. at 1.) The California Court awared thirty percent of the settlement (after 
deduction of costs) as attorneys fees, which award was divided among counsel as 
follows: Jones Waldo (49.5%), Post Kirby (40.5%), and Bennett's father (10%). 
(R. 1486-92.) 
8
 On February 1, 1993, Bennett filed a complaint with the Utah Bar against Jones Waldo 
(but for obvious reasons not against Post Kirby) raising the very issues alleged in his 
subsequent malpractice complaints. (See R. 299.) The Bar appointed a special 
investigator, who spent a year reviewing voluminous submissions by Bennett and 
independently interviewed the other class representatives, issued a lengthy written 
8 
16. In July 1994, at Jones Waldo's request and before the filing of any 
litigation, Post Kirby obtained from the California Court (pursuant to the jurisdiction 
retained in the settlement) a "Temporary Bar Order" against litigation collaterally 
attacking the finality of the class settlement. (R. 1071 (Compl. ffif 118-19); R. 1493; see 
also Post Kirby App. 1 (temporary bar order).) Bennett alleges that Kirby made 
misrepresentations9 to the California Court to obtain that order. (R. 1071, 1074, 1085-86 
(Compl. Tit 119, 136, 182, 184).) 
17. By order of the California Court, Bennett was served in Utah with the 
temporary bar order, which permitted Bennett to opposed any permanent bar order in 
California. (R. 1072 (Compl. ^ 121); Post Kirby App. 1 f 4.) 
18. On September 6, 1994, after giving Bennett an opportunity to appear, the 
Chief Judge of the California Court, Judge Judith N. Keep, entered a "Permanent Bar 
opinion rejecting each of Bennett's Complaints. (R. 1206-33.) That opinion offers an 
independent evaluation of the events complained of by Bennett, including the dropping of 
the derivative claims, the alleged subordination of perjury regarding payment of costs, 
and counsel's conduct during settlement. On the key settlement issues, the Bar found 
that, "[i]n short, this appears to be a case where a small minority of class representatives 
[e.g., Bennett] have attempted to block a reasonable settlement in order to satisfy their 
own 'special desires.'" (R. 1224-25.) The Bar also found that "Bennett freely admits 
that he was not coerced or intimidated by his lawyers" and none of the other class 
representatives substantiated Bennett's allegations of coercion or intimidation during 
settlement. (R. 1229-31.) 
9
 Bennett raised his claims of misrepresentation directly with the California Court, which 
court rejected Bennett's argument. (R. 867 at 3-5; see also R., 1549-50 at 9-10 (1/11/96 
transcript); id. at 1556-57 (court's findings); (R. 162-64 (1/11/96 transcript).) In any 
event, Bennett is collaterally estopped from alleging that the Bar Order was obtained by 
deceit in the California court given his unsuccessful appeal of that order in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
9 
Order." (R. 1520-22 (Kirby Aff, ex. 6); see also Post Kirby App. 2 (permanent bar 
order).) The Temporary Bar Order and Permanent Bar Order may be collectively 
referred to as the "Bar Order." The Bar Orders restrained Bennett from "initiating or 
maintaining any lawsuit against [Jones Waldo] . . . or any other class counsel which in 
any way involves" the "fairness of the class action settlement," the "competency of class 
counsel and counsel's legal services on behalf of the class," the "award of fees and costs 
to class counsel," and the "award of additional compensation to any of the named 
Plaintiffs" in the class action. (Post Kirby App. 1 f^ 2.) However, the Bar Order 
expressly did "not bar or restrain David D. Bennett from pursuing solely his own 
individual claims as a former Gen-Probe shareholder, except to the extent such claims 
have been previously adjudicated by this Court." (Id. ^ 2; see also R. 1521-22; R. 1073 
(Compl. Tf 129); R.1508-19 (transcript of 9/6/94); R. 1530-32 (transcript of 5/1/95); R. 
1568 (transcript of 1/11/96).) Thus, the Bar Order merely sought to protect the integrity 
of the orders of the California court, rather than bar Bennett from pursuing any 
appropriate individual malpractice claims. 
19. Bennett appealed the Bar Order to the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter "Bennett's 
California Bar-Order Appeal"). (R. 1073 (Compl. f 131).) 
20. While Bennett's California Bar-Order Appeal was pending, Bennett filed 
this action in Utah court against Jones Waldo (but not Post Kirby) on December 30, 
1994, and an amended complaint on January 20, 1995 (the "Utah Malpractice Lawsuit"). 
(R. 1073 (Compl. f 131); see also R. 163-68 (Bennett's "Notice of Orders Authorizing 
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Complaint" attaching a copy of the Bar Order and the transcript of the California Court's 
rulings with respect thereto).) (R. 163-68.) 
21. Bennett voluntarily submitted a copy of his complaints to the California 
Court to determine whether they complied with the Bar Order. (R. 249.) In response, 
Jones Waldo, using Post Kirby as counsel, moved the California Court to enforce the Bar 
Order and award civil contempt sanctions against Bennett. (R. 263 (Jones Waldo was 
listed as the moving party on R. 267); see also R. 1447 (Kirby Aff. f 55).) During the 
hearing on that motion in California, Bennett's counsel agreed to file a second amended 
complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit. (R. 377-79, 1535-36 (5/1/95 transcript).) 
22. On August 1, 1995, Bennett filed his second amended complaint in the 
Utah Malpractice Lawsuit. (R. 381-527; see also R. 361-80 (Bennett's Notice of Filing 
Date for Second Amended Complaint attaching the California Court order).) Again at 
Jones Waldo's request, Post Kirby filed another motion for contempt in California Court. 
(R. 1448 (Kirby Aff. | 57).) At a hearing on January 11, 1996, Bennett was found in 
contempt of the Bar Order. The California Court ordered that a transcript of its ruling be 
forwarded to Judge Medley to correct misrepresentations made by Bennett to Judge 
Medley concerning the California Court's prior ruling, ordered Bennett to comply with 
the Bar Orders, and further imposed monetary sanctions on Bennett. (R. 1538 (1/11/96 
transcript) at 7, 15, 21, 25); R. 1076 (Compl. ffl[ 141-44).) 
23. Bennett appealed his contempt citation ("Bennett's California Contempt 
Appeal"). (R. 1076 (Compl. f 145); R. 1448 (Kirby Aff. f 58).) 
11 
24. Bennett filed a third amended complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit 
against Jones Waldo, by omitting "under protest" the offending allegations. (R. 528-82.) 
25. On August 10, 1996, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bar Order in the 
Bennett's California Bar-Order Appeal. (R. 1581-84 (Kirby Aff, ex. 9); see also Post 
Kirby App. 3 (opinion).) The Ninth Circuit "narrowly construed" the Bar Order, 
however, so that the "Utah court may examine the adequacy of the class settlement, but 
only insofar as that settlement sheds light on appellee law firm's representation of 
Bennett." (Id.) Bennett unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 
26. In June 1997, the Ninth Circuit reversed the contempt citation in the 
Bennett's California Contempt Appeal based on its narrow construction of the Bar Order. 
(R.1077 (Compl. Tj 147); R. 1584 (Kirby Aff, ex. 10); Appellant's App. 5, 9 (opinion)).) 
Fourth Amended Complaint 
27. On July 7, 1998, Bennett filed his 204-paragraph Fourth Amended 
Complaint in the Utah Malpractice Lawsuit, adding Post Kirby as a defendant for the first 
time. Bennett alleges the following causes of action: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that Post Kirby breached the 
Retainer Agreement by allegedly abandoning injunctive, derivative and insider-trading 
claims in the California Gen-Probe Litigation, settling the case early rather than 
"look[ing] towards 'trial of the Lawsuit/" and litigating the Bar Order in California 
rather than Utah court. (R. 1080-81 (Compl. ^ 159, 161, 164).) Bennett seeks damages 
for the "true value of [his] Gen-Probe shares," his "out-of-pocket expenses" in the 
12 
California Gen-Probe Litigation, and his attorneys5 fees and costs in litigating the Bar 
Order in California courts. (R. 1095 (Compl. at 53).) 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that Post Kirby breached 
fiduciary duties and committed legal malpractice by allegedly pressuring an unfavorable 
settlement of the class action without an "independent financial evaluation" of the claims, 
despite Bennett's objections and without his consent. (R. 1080-84 (Compl. TflJ 160-71, 
173, 176).) Bennett seeks the same damages as in his breach of contract claim, and 
forfeiture of Post Kirby's "entire fee" in the California Gen-Probe case. (R. 1096 
(Compl. at 54).) 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett alleges that the Bar Orders were an abuse 
of process and an intentional infliction of emotional distress,. (R. 1085-89 (Compl. ^ 
180-97).) Bennett seeks the cost of his "mental health counseling," his emotional 
anxiety, damage to reputation, etc., allegedly caused by the Bar Order litigation, and his 
fees and expenses in litigating the Bar Order in California. (R. 1096-97 (Compl. at 54-
55).) 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Bennett claims that Post Kirby committed deceit 
and collusion in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-31 by misrepresenting facts to the 
California Court in the California Gen-Probe Litigation and Bar Order proceedings, 
(R. 1090-94 (Compl. fflf 199d, j , k, m, o, 200a, b, c)), misrepresenting facts to Bennett 
during the California Gen-Probe Litigation, (R. 1090-91 (Compl. f 199a-I)), and 
allegedly colluding with Gen-Probe's counsel regarding the class settlement, (R. 1093 
(Compl. % 199p)). Bennett again seeks the same damages as in his breach of contract 
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claim, and emotional distress and other damages from Post Kirby's alleged abuse of 
process in the Bar Order litigation, all of which he asks to be trebled. (R. 1096-97.) 
Course and Disposition of Proceedings after the Joinder of Post Kirby 
28. On September 4, 1998, Post Kirby moved to dismiss the complaint for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 1382-1587 (moving papers); R. 1588-1754 
(opposition papers); R. 1821-37 (reply papers).) Post Kirby argued that it did not have 
"minimum contacts" with the State of Utah for either set of Bennett's claims, and that 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Judge Medley heard argument on 
Post Kirby's motion to dismiss on October 25, 1999. (See R. 1844, 2147 (transcript).) 
29. On January 7, 2000, Judge Medley issued a minute entry granting Post 
Kirby's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on all grounds argued by 
Post Kirby, and directed Post Kirby to prepare an order. (R. 1857-58.) 
30. Post Kirby prepared and served on Bennett a proposed Rule 54(b) 
Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, 
Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually. (R. 1923.) Bennett 
objected to the minute entry and proposed order on January 28, 2000. (R. 1859-74.) 
Post Kirby responded on February 7, 2000, together with a courtesy copy of the 
proposed judgment. (R. 1875-81.) Post Kirby argued that Bennett's "objections are 
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not well founded," and "[consequently, this Court should sign the accompanying 
proposed judgment."10 (R. 1875.) 
31. On February 11, 2000, Judge Medley signed and entered the proposed 
judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (R. 1884-85, 1924; Post 
Kirby App. 4.) Judge Medley has confirmed that he reviewed Bennett's objections 
prior to signing the judgment, and intended his signature to reflect his rejection of those 
objections. (Post Kirby App. 5 at 15 (transcript of 10/2/00); R. 2148 at 2 (transcript of 
10/6/00).) 
32. On February 16, 2000, Bennett filed a "Reply of Plaintiff in Support of 
his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order" wherein he expressly 
argued that his objections were "not a Rule 59, U.R.Civ.P.. motion." (R. 1886-93.) 
33. On February 17, 2000, Post Kirby filed a notice to submit stating that, 
"Now that the issue of the proposed judgment and objections thereto is fully at issue, 
the Post Kirby Defendants submit the proposed judgment to the Court for signature," 
and also filed another courtesy copy of the proposed judgment. (R. 1894-97.) 
34. On February 28, 2000, Judge Medley, forgetting that he had already 
signed a judgment, again signed and entered the proposed judgment, but no notice of 
entry was provided to either party. (R. 1896-97; see also Post Kirby App. 5 at 15-16 
10
 Post Kirby noted that much of Bennett's objection was in fact a request for 
reconsideration or new trial. Post Kirby asked the court that, inasmuch as Bennett "has 
now had his chance to ask the Court for reconsideration," Post Kirby should not have to 
respond to another further motions under Rule 59. (R. 1880.) 
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(transcript of 10/2/00); Post Kirby App. 6 (2/28/00 judgment).) Judge Medley again 
confirmed that he reviewed Bennett's objections prior to signing the judgment, and 
intended his signature to reflect his rejection of those objections. (R. 2148 at 2-3; see 
also Post Kirby App. 5 at 15-16.) 
35. On May 9, 2000, Post Kirby first learned of the entry of the judgments, 
and promptly served by hand and facsimile a "Notice of Entry of Judgment" on May 
10, 2000.11 (R. 1898-1903, 1924.) 
36. On May 26,2000, Bennett filed a Motion to the Court under Rule 60 to 
Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon a Timely Filed Rule 59 
Motion" (the "May 2000 Motion"), arguing that the February 11th judgment was the 
operative judgment, the February 28th judgment (but not the February 11th judgment) 
should be stricken under Rule 60 as a clerical mistake and under Rule 58A for Post 
Kirby's alleged failure to provide timely notice of judgment, and that his February 16th 
reply brief in support of his objections to the proposed judgment should be construed as 
a Rule 59 motion upon which the Court had yet to rule.12 (R. 1904-20.) Post Kirby 
11
 The notice was served within the 90-day period in Rule 60(b) for relief from 
judgments. 
12
 Bennett did not seek relief from either judgment under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) due to mistake 
or excusable neglect. The only time that Bennett cited those provisions was in 
connection with his argument that the February 28th judgment should be stricken as a 
ministerial error (point 1), or to argue that Post Kirby's allegedly untimely notice 
prevented Bennett from seeking relief under those sections (point 4). (R. 1910, 1915, 
1948, 1950.) 
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opposed Bennett's motion, arguing that his objections were not a motion for new trial 
under Rule 59 and, in any event, the district court's entry of the judgments disposed of 
those objections by necessary implication. (R. 1921-36; see also R. 1947-53 (Bennett's 
reply papers).) 
37. On June 9, 2000, Bennett filed a "Notice of Appeal of Final Order" 
("Bennett's First Utah Appeal"). (R. 1937-42.) Bennett's notice stated that he was 
appealing from the February 28th judgment, and that the appeal was timely because the 
"appeal falls within 30 days of the notice date." (R. 1938-39.) Although Bennett argued 
that a Rule 59 motion was in fact pending, he expressly stated in his Docketing 
Statement that his appeal was filed solely under the alternative assumption that there 
was no pending Rule 59 motion. (Post Kirby App. 7 (docketing statement).) 
38. Post Kirby moved for summary disposition of Blennett's First Utah Appeal 
because it was untimely. (Post Kirby App. 8 (motion papers without exhibits).) Post 
Kirby did not ask this Court to decide the issue raised in Bemiett's May 2000 Motion as 
to whether or not a Rule 59 was in fact still pending. The resolution of the Rule 59 
issue was unnecessary to establish the untimeliness of Bennett's First Utah Appeal. 
39. On July 25, 2000, apparently recognizing that his "notice date" basis for 
appeal was frivolous, Bennett filed a "Motion to Remand and Vacate Briefing 
Schedule" "for the purpose of allowing [the] lower cour t . . . to decide an outstanding 
motion relevant to this appeal" ("Remand Motion"). (Post Kirby App. 9 (remand 
papers).) This motion represented an abandonment of the basis for appellate 
17 
jurisdiction that Bennett claimed in his Docketing Statement, which was that the time 
for appeal ran from the date on which he received notice of the entry of the February 
Judgments. Bennett now exclusively contended that there was an undecided Rule 59 
motion, and asked this Court to remand the matter so that the district court could decide 
the pending May 2000 Motion. Neither party asked this Court to resolve the issue of 
whether there was in fact a pending Rule 59 motion, and the briefing did not contain 
argument on the merits of that issue. 
40. On October 2, 2000, Judge Medley heard argument on Bennett's May 
Motion. (R. 1966-67; see also Post Kirby App. 5 (transacript of 10/2/00).) During 
that argument, Judge Medley explained the circumstances surrounding his entry of the 
February 2000 judgments: 
This is what I believe happened in this situation: When that first notice to 
submit for decision was submitted to me and when I had before me the objection 
and response thereto, I clearly reviewed the objection and the - and the response 
and - the February 11th decision. 
Shortly thereafter, a subsequent notice to submit was given to me and I 
reviewed once again all of the documents I had in front of me but quite frankly, 
there was - there would have been, oh, a little over a two-week passage of time 
between . . . . I simply did not recall, unfortunately, that I had signed the 
February 11th judgment; but the point I'm getting at is, two things occurred here, 
I did not recall I signed the February 11th judgment; but clearly, I reviewed the 
objections and made a determination that the objections were not - did not have 
merit in my - in my opinion. 
The second thing that I traditionally do and I didn't do in this particular 
situation and I just can't explain it, quite frankly, is that ordinarily, I would have 
written on the judgment, interlineation, that the objections were denied. I did 
not do that in this particular case, but I can assure you as certain as I am sitting 
in this chair for right now, when I signed those judgments, I passed judgment on 
the issues - on the merits of the issues raised within those objections. 
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(Post Kirby App. 4 at 15-16 (emphasis added).) On October 6, 2000, Judge Medley 
denied Bennett's motion in its entirety ("October Ruling"), finding that the court had 
already disposed of any possible Rule 59 motion back in February. (R. 2148 at 2-3.) 
41. On October 25, 2000, this Court dismissed Bennett's First Utah Appeal 
("Appeal Dismissal Order"). (R. 1991-93.) This Court stated: 
Defendants' motion to dismiss this appeal is granted. Plaintiff's notice of 
appeal, filed while a rule 59 motion was pending at the district court, was 
premature, and this court lacks jurisdiction. Swenson Assocs. Architects v. 
State, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). 
(IdL) 
42. Bennett then filed a series of documents with the district court arguing 
that the this Court's Appeal Dismissal Order "effectively" overruled the district court's 
October Ruling. (R. 2003-10, 2016-2102; see also R. 2103-2117 (Post Kirby's 
opposition); R. 2128-33 (Bennett's reply papers).) 
43. On February 23, 2001, this Court also dismissed a related appeal against 
Jones Waldo. (Appellant's App. 11.) The Court stated: 
This appeal is dismissed on the court's own motion on the ground there has been 
no final judgment entered, and this court lacks jurisdiction. The order 
dismissing the law firm of Jones Waldo was not certified as a final judgment 
under rule 54(b) Utah R. Civ. P. Because the judgment dismissing the law firm 
of Post Kirby has never been finalized, there is no final judgment in this case. 
This appeal is dismissed without prejudice. 
44. On February 21, 2001, Judge Medley heard all outstanding motions and 
issues. (Post Kirby App. 10 (2/21/01 transcript).) The district court then entered an 
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order dated February 28, 2001 ("February 2001 Order"). (Appellant's App. 2.) The 
district court stated: 
This Order resolves the purported Rule 59 Motion. To the extent, if any, 
plaintiffs Objections or Reply [filed in January and February 2000 and which 
Bennett claimed were his Rule 59 motion], they have been previously considered 
and rejected on their merits as set forth in the Court's February Judgments. 
(Id. t 1 at 2 (emphasis added).) The district court further correctly refused to apply the 
Mandate Rule based on this Court's October 25, 2000 Order: 
After review of the Supreme Court's October 25, 2000, and February 23, 2001, 
Orders and circumstances issued thereunder this Court finds and concludes that 
the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of any Rule 59 Motion, therefore, 
the Mandate Rule does not apply. 
(Id. 1 2 at 3.) Thus, Judge Medley held that the February 11 and 28, 2000 judgments 
rejected in fact and by necessary implication any Rule 59 relief of Bennett so that no 
timely Rule 59 motions were pending thereafter. 
45. Bennett filed this appeal on March 27, 2001. Although Bennett appeals 
the February 28, 2001 order, which denied Bennett's May 2000 Motion, Bennett's brief 
does not address the district court's ruling on that motion, but rather merely argues the 
personal jurisdiction issues decided by the district court back in January 2000. 
20 
ARGUMENT 
I. BENNETT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
RULING ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Bennett did not file an appeal within thirty days of the entry of either the February 
II , 2000 or February 28, 2000 Rule 54(b) judgments. Bennett argues he timely filed a 
Rule 59 motion, which was not denied by Judge Medley until almost a year later on 
February 21, 2001. Bennett is wrong because, first, there was no pending rule 59 motion 
after February 28, 2000, at the latest, and, second, this Court's dismissal of Bennett's 
prior appeals did not effectively overrule Judge Medley's decisions on that point. 
A. There Was No Pending Rule 59 Motion After February 28, 2000. 
Bennett argues that his objections were actually a motion for new trial, which 
motion the district court did not decide until February 2001, so that his current appeal 
was timely with respect to that order. Plaintiffs argument fails to for two reasons. 
1. Bennett Filed No Rule 59 Motion 
Bennett's objections to the proposed judgment (filed January 28, 2000, and 
February 16, 2000) cannot be construed as a Rule 59 request because Plaintiff expressly 
disclaimed any reliance on that rule. He stated in that briefing: 
Plaintiffs Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order is not a 
Rule 59, U.KCiv.P. motion." 
(R. 1892 (emphasis in original).) Thus, Plaintiff expressly denied any possible 
characterization of the motion as one under Rule 59. 
21 
2. The District Court Denied any Rule 59 Motion No Later Than 
February 28, 2000 
Even if Bennett's objections to the proposed order could be characterized as 
seeking Rule 59 relief, such relief was denied by Judge Medley no later than February 28, 
2000, over a year before Bennett's current appeal was filed. Judge Medley has expressly 
confirmed that he intended the February 2000 judgments to reflect a denial of Bennett's 
objections. 
Alternatively, those judgments rejected Bennett's objection by necessary 
implication. While "[t]he mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent with but silent 
regarding a post-trial pre-judgment motion does not dispose of the motion by necessary 
implication," such is not the case where "the surrounding circumstances indicate that the 
trial court considered and rejected the motion." Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051, 1054 
(Utah 1999); see also Kurth v. Wiarda, 981 P.2d 417 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In this case, 
the circumstances indicate such a rejection. 
Both the February 11 and 28 judgments were clearly inconsistent with the relief 
requested by Bennett because his so-called Rule 59 motion was in fact an objection to the 
proposed form of judgment ultimately signed by the district court. Moreover, the 
circumstances surrounding the entry of both judgments indicate that the district court had 
considered and rejected Bennett's objections. The initial proposed judgment was served 
and filed simultaneously with Post Kirby's response to Bennett's objections, which 
response requested that the proposed judgment be signed and entered as a 
"[c]onsequen[ce]" Bennett's objections "not [being] well founded." (R. 1875 at 1.). 
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Similarly, on February 17, 2000, after the close of all briefing on Bennett's objections, Post 
Kirby filed a notice to submit Plaintiffs objections to decision and another copy of his proposed 
judgment, which notice requested the Court's signature nf the proposed judgment as a rejection 
of Plaintiff s objections. (R. 1894-95 at 1-2 ("Now that the issue of the proposed judgment and 
objections thereto is fully at issue, the Post Kirby Defendants submit the proposed judgment to 
the Court for signature.").) Under these circumstances, Post Kirby's submission of the proposed 
judgment and simultaneous filing supports Post Kirby's belief that the Court had 
considered and indicated its rejection of Plaintiff s objections by signing the judgment. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563, 564 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (the court "implicitly 
denied plaintiffs objections" to a proposed order by signing the proposed order after the 
filing of objections, even though the order did not expressly rule on the objections). 
Consequently, this case was at issue for appeal no later than February 28, 2000, so that 
Bennett's notices of appeal were all untimely. 
B. This Court Did Not Overrule the District Court's October Decision 
Bennett has argued that this Court "effectively overrule[d] the District Court's 
recent October 6, 2000, tentative ruling" and that "the 'law of the case5 is now that the 
District Court must now rule upon plaintiffs 'rule 59 motion' filed on February 16, 
2000." (R. 2004.) In February 2001, however, Judge Medley ruled that the Utah 
Supreme Court's October 25 Order is nothing more than a statement that, based on 
Bennett's characterization of the procedural posture of the case, his appeal was untimely 
and the circumstances surrounding that order indicate that the Rule 59 issue was not 
before this court. (Appellant's App. 2 12 at 3 ("After a review of the Supreme Court's 
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October 25, 2000 and February 23, 2001 orders and circumstances issued thereunder, this 
Court finds and concludes that the Supreme Court did not consider the merits of any Rule 
59 Motion, therefore the Mandate Rule does not apply).) 
The "mandate rule" requires a lower court to follow legal pronouncements of an 
appellate court on remand, and the letter and spirit of such pronouncements are 
determined "taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it 
embraces." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995) (emphasis 
added). However, the mandate rule applies only to issues actually decided and not to 
dictum or statements made by a court in passing. 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice § 134.20[3] at 134-45 (3d ed. 2000). The circumstances surrounding the 
October 25th Order indicate that this Court did not pass upon the merits of whether Judge 
Medley had in fact or by necessary implication denied Bennett's objections by entry of 
the February 2000 judgments. Rather, that order was merely recognition that, even under 
Bennett's characterization of the facts, his appeal was untimely. 
First, the Rule 59 issue was not substantively raised in Post Kirby's briefing to this 
Court. The reason was that resolution of the Rule 59 issue was not necessary to the 
dismissal of Bennett's First Utah Appeal. This Court did not need to reach this issue to 
grant Post Kirby's motion to dismiss. 
Second, neither party asked the Utah Supreme Court to make any determination 
regarding the May 2000 Motion then pending before the district court. Both parties 
recognized (and informed the Court) that Judge Medley should rule in the first instance 
on whether a Rule 59 motion was still pending. 
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Third, there is no indication that this Court actually considered the substantive 
arguments raised in the briefing and oral arguments before the district court. The Order 
does not acknowledge or dispose of the underlying issues relevant to the substance of the 
Rule 59 issue, such as Bennett's express disclaimer of reliance on Rule 59 in the 
document he now contends was a Rule 59 motion or the denial of a Rule 59 motion by 
necessary implication, or cite any case authority relied on by either party before the 
district court on the merits such as DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), relied on by Bennett, or Morgan v. Morgan, 975 P.2d 563 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), relied on by Post Kirby. 
Fourth, the procedural posture of Bennett's First Utah Appeal indicates that the 
Rule 59 issue was not a consideration in the disposition of that appeal. Originally, 
Bennett claimed that his appeal was filed only based on the premise that the district court 
had already in fact ruled on any Rule 59 motion. However, as Post Kirby pointed out in 
its motion to dismiss, that argument was frivolous based on the express language in Rule 
5 8A. Consequently, in mid-appeal, Bennett tacitly abandoned any attempt to justify his 
appeal on those grounds (and made no mention of that ground in any subsequent brief). 
Rather, Bennett flipped-flopped to the opposite and contradictory factual assumption, i.e., 
that there was an unresolved Rule 59 motion, but that the Court should only "remand," 
rather than "dismiss" the appeal. Thus, the only issue confronted by the Court was 
whether it should "remand" the case (as argued by Bennett) or "dismiss" the case (as 
suggested by Post Kirby). Unfortunately for Bennett, he gave the Court no legal basis for 
a remand rather than dismissal in light of his position as to the relevancy of any pending 
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Rule 59 motion to his appeal. Given Bennett's new position on appeal that there was a 
pending Rule 59 motion, the Utah Supreme Court had no choice but to dismiss the appeal 
(as supported by the Court's citation of a generic case on this point rather than a more 
specific case applicable to the substance of the Rule 59 issue. 
Thus, the October 25 Order should not, therefore, be construed to have overruled 
Judge Medley's October 6, 2000 determination that any Rule 59 motion had been 
resolved in February 2000.13 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BENNETT'S CLAIMS 
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
The district court properly dismissed Bennett's claims against Post Kirby 
regarding its prosecution of the California Gen-Probe Lawsuit and the California Bar 
Order for lack of a prima facie showing personal jurisdiction, in particular any showing 
of sufficient minimum contacts with Utah consistent with due process. 
A. BENNETT MUST MAKE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF 
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH LAW FOR 
EACH CLAIM 
Prior to trial or an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, Bennett must make 
a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.14 Anderson v. American Soc'y of 
13
 Bennett's appeal of Judge Medley's denial of Bennett's May 2000 motion actually only 
raises the issues in the May 2000 motion, rather than Judge Medley's February 2000 
ruling on personal jurisdiction. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 
UT App. 110,1ffll8-19, 24-25, 2 P.3d 451. In his argument, Bennett skips the May 2000 
issues and goes directly to personal jurisdiction. (Bennett Br. at 43-48). 
14
 In his brief, Bennett raises no issue as to any possible general jurisdiction against Post 
Kirby. 
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Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990); see also Phones 
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, [^2, 8 P.3d 256. At this stage of the litigation, 
Bennett's allegations are taken as true unless controverted by affidavit. Anderson, 807 
P.2d at 827. If controverted by affidavit, Bennett cannot simply rely on his complaint for 
his prima facie showing of jurisdiction; however, any disputes in the documentary record 
are resolved in Bennett's favor. Id. 
Bennett must show specific personal jurisdiction for each defendant on each 
separate cause of action. See Baldwin v. Easterling, 754 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1988) 
("Jurisdiction over a nonresident for one claim of a plaintiff does not generally confer 
jurisdiction over the nonresident for other claims that plaintiff may have55); Far West 
Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076 n.4 (10th Cir. 1995) ("contacts of multiple 
parties cannot be aggregated to reach the personal jurisdiction standard55). In the present 
case, this means that Bennett must independently establish personal jurisdiction on his 
malpractice-related claims and the bar order-related claims, respectively. 
Utah courts use a three-part test for specific personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant: 
(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must implicate Utah under the Utah long-arm 
statute; (2) a "nexus55 must exist between the plaintiffs claims and the defendant's 
acts or contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the 
requirements of federal due process. 
Phone Directories, 2000 UT 64 at f 12 (quoting Harnischfeger Eng'rs, Inc. v. Uniflo 
Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Utah 1995)). However, this Court can go 
directly to the "due process analysis first because any set of circumstances that satisfies 
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due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. American 
Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998). 
To satisfy due process, Bennett must show that Post Kirby had "minimum 
contacts" with Utah. Id. at 435. This Court explained this requirement as follows: 
It is well established that jurisdiction must result from "minimum contacts 
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."5" Consequently, 
defendant must have "'purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.5" Specific personal jurisdiction "may be asserted . . . 'only on claims arising 
out of defendant's forum-state activity,5'5 and the connection between the 
defendant and the forum state must be such that the defendant "'should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.555 Finally, "the determination of whether 
Utah can justify asserting jurisdiction over defendants hinges on the balancing of 
the fairness to the parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction.55 
Id. (citations omitted). As Bennett apparently conceded below, whether the claim sounds 
in contract or tort, courts look to those contacts that are the "focal point" of either the 
contractual relationship or the tort and its harm. (R. 1768.) See also Far West, 46 F.3d at 
1075, 1080 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1985)). Consequently, courts 
take a "realistic approach" in analyzing the "entire relationship of the parties" to 
determine whether a defendant has "purposefully established minimum contacts within 
the forum." Id. at 1075 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
Bennett has not made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts with regard to 
either the California Gen-Probe Lawsuit or the California Bar Order Litigation. 
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B. POST KIRBY DID NOT HAVE MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH 
UTAH REGARDING THE CALIFORNIA MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS 
In his briefing (on appeal and below), Bennett appears to raise four arguments for 
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby on claims arising out of the 
California Gen-Probe Litigation: (1) Post Kirby knowingly agreed to represent Utah 
clients, (R. 1049 (Compl. ]f 4)), (2) Post Kirby allegedly committed "[n]umerous legal 
malpractices" in Utah, (Appellant's Br. at 46-47; R.), (3) Post Kirby allegedly injured 
Bennett in Utah, (id. at 44, 46), and (4) Post Kirby allegedly formed a "Utah joint 
venture" with Jones Waldo in representing him, (id at 47). 
Utah appellate courts have not addressed specific personal jurisdiction in the state 
of the client's residence over out-of-state litigation counsel on malpractice claims arising 
out of out-of-state litigation. However, other courts have found that, in the absence of 
special circumstances (not found in the present case), out-of-state counsel is not generally 
subject to personal jurisdiction in courts at the client's residence for conduct relating to 
out-of-state litigation. Post Kirby will first review some of the leading cases on point 
from other jurisdictions prior to addressing Bennett's specific arguments as to his 
malpractice claims. 
1. Local Litigation Counsel Is Not Normally Subject to Jurisdiction 
in Courts of the Client's Residence for Malpractice Claims 
A number of courts have refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
counsel regarding malpractice in out-of-state litigation in the forum of the client's 
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residence.15 See generally Cape v. von Maur, 932 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D. Md. 1996) 
("case law overflows on the point that providing out-of-state legal representation is not 
enough to subject an out-of-state lawyer o law firm to the personal jurisdiction of the 
state in which a client resides"). In particular, three decisions from federal courts of 
appeal demonstrate that personal jurisdiction over out-of-state litigation counsel is not 
generally exercised unless there is an ongoing attorney-client relationship or some other 
special availment of the law of the state of the client's residence. 
15
 See FDIC v. Malmo, 939 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1991) (no jurisdiction in Missouri over 
Tennessee counsel for breach of fiduciary duty regarding California litigation, despite 
allegation that the "effects of defendant's misconduct... were intended to, and did occur 
in Missouri"); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (no jurisdiction in Wisconsin 
over Michigan lawyer for malpractice claims related to dismissal of Michigan litigation, 
despite counsel's alleged misstatements to the client in Wisconsin as to case status); 
Kowlaski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (no 
jurisdiction in New Hampshire over Massachusetts law firm regarding negligence in 
Massachusetts litigation); Bryant v. Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, 844 F. 
Supp. 640, 642 (D. Or. 1994) (no jurisdiction in Oregon over California counsel for 
malpractice in California litigation because the malpractice injury arose from the alleged 
malpractice in California), affd, 42 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
v. Servidone Construction Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1496, 1505 (D. Minn. 1991) (no 
jurisdiction in Minnesota over New York counsel in Washington D.C. litigation - "an 
attorney-client relationship, regardless of who initiates it, is insufficient in and of itself to 
support personal jurisdiction"); McGann v. Wilson, 701 A.2d 873 (Md. Ct. App. 1977) 
(no jurisdiction in Maryland over Virginia counsel for malpractice claims by Maryland 
resident arising out of undue pressure to settle Virginia litigation - local counsel "could 
not have expected to be hauled into a Maryland court to answer a claim for malpractice 
concerning a settlement of a personal injury case where the injury, the trial, and the 
settlement occurred in Virginia"); DeVenzeio v. Rucker, Clarkson & McCashin, 918 P.2d 
723 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (no jurisdiction in New Mexico over California counsel for 
malpractice claims related to California and Arizona litigation, despite alleged "deceitful, 
fraudulent misrepresentations in letters and telephone calls to [the clients] in New 
Mexico"); Weiss v. Greenburg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 446 
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (no jurisdiction in New York over Florida counsel 
for malpractice claims in foreclosure litigation in Florida, despite counsel visits and 
communications to New York). 
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In Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1987), a South Dakota 
company brought suit in South Dakota against its New York counsel for malpractice 
allegedly committed in Maryland litigation. However, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction in South Dakota over New York counsel would offend 
due process despite counsel's representation of and/or communications and visits with 
the South Dakota client: 
While we do not dispute Austad's claim that an attorney-client relationship 
existed between Austad and Pennie & Edmonds, we do not believe that Pennie & 
Edmonds had sufficient contacts with South Dakota to confer personal 
jurisdiction. Pennie & Edmonds does not maintain an office in South Dakota nor 
do any of its attorneys reside there or maintain a license to practice law there. 
Pennie & Edmonds has never advertised or solicited business in South Dakota. 
Further, Pennie & Edmonds did not actively seek out Austad as a client. Rather, 
the representation of Austad by Pennie & Edmonds was arranged through Richard 
Goldstein, president of a New York corporation which was a regular client of the 
law firm. Finally, the actions giving rise to this lawsuit took place in Maryland, 
not in South Dakota. In short, Pennie & Edmonds' only "substantial connection" 
with South Dakota was its representation of a South Dakota corporation in 
connection with litigation taking place wholly outside of South Dakota. Based on 
these facts, we do not believe a showing has been made that Pennie & Edmonds 
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of South 
Dakota. 
Id. at 226-27. 
The First Circuit likewise found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state litigation counsel would offend due process in Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381 
(1st Cir. 1995). That case involved a claim by New Hampshire clients against their 
Florida counsel for negligent settlement of a Florida lawsuit. The First Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs' argument (also made by Bennett in this case) that "the act of knowingly 
agreeing to represent an out-of-state client is plainly sufficient55 to establish personal 
31 
jurisdiction." Id. at 1391. Rather, the First Circuit held that the "mere existence of an 
attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by other sufficient contacts with the forum, 
does not confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident in the forum state; more is 
required." Id. The First Circuit likewise rejected plaintiffs' argument (also made by 
Bennett in the present case) that the negligence occurred in New Hampshire when their 
counsel wrote and called them to recommend settlement, and that the injury or effect of 
the malpractice was felt in New Hampshire where they resided.16 The court noted that it 
would "be illogical to conclude that those isolated recommendations constituted the 
negligent conduct that caused the Florida injury" because the negligence actually 
consisted of the attorneys allegedly inadequate investigation, "which informed their 
judgment about the amount and propriety of the proposed settlement," which 
investigation would have occurred where the lawsuit was pending or the attorneys 
resided. Id. The court found that the settlement recommendations were merely 
16
 Below, Bennett attempted to distinguish the negligent settlement recommendation in 
Sawtelle from the present case because it was not made during a personal visit of counsel 
in the forum state. (R. 1674-75.) However, the First Circuit's decision did not turn on a 
distinction between personal visits versus mail/telephone communications with the client 
in the forum state. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1386 ("Although Farrell never personally met the 
plaintiffs, he sent at least fifteen letters to them in New Hampshire and spoke to them by 
telephone on numerous occasions during the representation"). In fact, the First Circuit 
discussed and relied on decisions by other courts where personal visits by counsel to the 
forum state did not necessarily create sufficient minimum contacts. Id. at 1391 
("telephone calls, mailings, and three visits by lawyer were not enough) (discussing inter 
alia Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1990)). Rather, the important 
factor was that the contacts (whether personal, telephonic, or by mail) were "ancillary" to 
the allegedly negligent prosecution and settlement of litigation in another state. As will 
be discussed below, Post Kirby's Utah contacts were likewise "ancillary" to the 
California Gen-Probe Litigation. 
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"ancillary to the allegedly negligent non-forum activities." Id. at 1390-91. Further, the 
court rejected the argument that the "injury" occurred at the clients' residence because 
that was where the "effects" of the negligence were allegedly felt. The court noted that 
the "injury suffered by the Sawtelles as a result of the alleged negligent activities - the 
loss of their right to an adequate recovery on the wrongful death claim which had "been 
filed in Florida - occurred in Florida when the state court approved the recommended 
settlement and terminated the pending lawsuit." 17 Id. at 1390 n. 5. 
Further in Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that the representation of a California resident in Florida litigation would not 
normally confer jurisdiction over the Florida counsel: 
Out-of-state legal representation does not establish purposeful availment of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, where the law firm is solicited 
in its own state and takes no affirmative action to promote business within the 
forum state. 
Id. at 1363. The court held that the normal incidents of such representation, including 
counsel's visits to and communications with its client in the forum state, would not 
demonstrate that the law firm was "availing itself of any significant [forum] privilege by 
coming into the state to talk to its client." Id. Such visits would be "little more than a 
17
 Sawtelle also distinguished cases where the attorney had an ongoing attorney-client 
relationships over multiple matters. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1392 (citing Trinity Indus., Inc. 
v. Myers & Assocs., Ltd., 41 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1995) (40 matters over 8 years); and 
Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980) (multiple matters over two years)). 
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convenience to the client, who would otherwise have had to travel to [counsel's 
offices]."18 Id. 
These cases demonstrate that, in the absence of some other special availment of 
forum law, local counsel in out-of-state litigation does not purposefully establish 
minimum contacts with its client's residence for legal malpractice claims arising from the 
underlying litigation. The routine contacts "ancillary" to the litigation between client and 
counsel in the forum state are not qualitatively significant for due process purposes. 
2. Post Kirby Did Not Purposefully Establish Utah Contacts in Its 
Representation of Bennett in California 
Application of the above legal principles to the facts in this case shows that Post 
Kirby did not "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
[Utah], thus invoking the benefits and protection of [Utah's] laws." SII, 969 P.2d at 435. 
Post Kirby's representation of Bennett in the California Gen-Probe Litigation did not 
entail any ongoing relationship or other special circumstances that would demonstrate 
that Post Kirby purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Utah law. 
18
 Below, Bennett argued that the number of contacts in Sher (where the court ultimately 
sustained jurisdiction) were "far fewer" than Post Kirby's visits and communications to 
Utah in this case. (R.. 1675-75.) However, personal jurisdiction turns on the "quality 
and nature" of the contacts rather than merely on the "quantity" of contacts. See 
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992). As 
set forth in Sher, with the exception of a California trust deed, the alleged contacts were 
qualitatively insignificant because they were incidental to out-of-state litigation and 
merely a "convenience" to the client. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1363. in Sher the Ninth Circuit 
exercised jurisdiction, however, because the Florida counsel had required a California 
trust deed to secure payment for its services, which constituted a purposeful availment of 
California law because the law firm "was looking to the laws of California to secure its 
right to payment." Id. No such fact is present in this case. 
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a. Post Kirby's Decision to Represent a Class that Included 
Utah Members, such as Bennett, Did Not Create 
Jurisdiction in this Case 
Bennett has claimed that Post Kirby's decision to represent him constitutes a 
purposeful availment of Utah law. (R. 1044 (Compl. 14).) However, as described 
above, the "mere existence of an attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by other 
sufficient contacts with the forum, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident in the forum state; more is required."19 See, e.g., Sawtelle,70 F.3d at 1392; 
see also Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; Weiss, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 449. This rule is consistent 
with Utah precedent that the mere contracting with a Utah resident does not necessarily 
create jurisdiction in Utah courts. See Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988); 
accord Far West, 46 F.3d at 1075-80. 
Post Kirby did not solicit its representation of Bennett in Utah or elsewhere. 
Rather, Jones Waldo approached Post Kirby in California to act as local and co-counsel 
in the California litigation. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1392; Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; cf 
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah 1994) 
("Although the fact that a defendant initiates a business transaction is not dispositive, it 
tends to confirm the purposeful direction of the defendant's activities toward the forum 
19
 Bennett cites no cases on point in his appellate brief. The only decision to the contrary 
cited by Bennett below was Brown v. Watson, 255 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
(R. 1679-81.) That decision was specifically criticized by the Ninth Circuit in Sher, 911 
F.2d at 1363 n.2, is inconsistent with Utah decisions rejecting that causing an "effect" in 
the state is sufficient, Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's Boat & Motors, Inc., 494 P.2d 532, 
533 (Utah 1972); accord Far West, 46 F.3d at 1079-80, and decisions from other 
jurisdictions on point, see, e.g., Austad, 823 F.2d at 226; Weiss, 446 N.Y.S. 2d at 449. 
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state."). Post Kirby does not maintain offices in Utah, does not solicit clients or advertise 
in Utah, and has no attorneys licensed to practice in Utah. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1385; 
Austad, 823 F.2d at 224; DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 724. Unlike Jones Waldo, Post Kirby 
was not a party to the Retainer Agreement and did not consent to or seek resolution of 
attorney-client disputes in Utah courts or under Utah law. McGann, 701 A.2d at 877. 
Post Kirby's representation of Bennett was limited to a single lawsuit in 
California. Cf Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988) (the absence of any 
"substantial connections, continuing relationships, and obligations" with forum residents 
supported finding of due process violation). The services to be rendered by Post Kirby 
would be primarily performed in California. See Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 10 ("It seems 
obvious that if there were a contract, it would be performed wholly in [the state where the 
litigation was pending]"). Moreover, Post Kirby's compensation for its legal services 
was to be awarded solely by the California Court, rather than through any availment of 
Utah law. Cf Sher, 911 F.2d at 1363-64 (trust deed in forum justified a finding of 
specific personal jurisdiction). 
b. Post Kirby's Visits to and Communications with Bennett 
in Utah Did Not Establish Minimum Contacts in this Case 
Bennett claims that Utah courts have jurisdiction over Post Kirby because it 
visited Utah ten times for the California Gen-Probe Litigation, and committed legal 
malpractice during some of those visits (i.e., preparation of Fourth Amended Complaint 
dropping derivative claims, and negligent advice regarding the proposed class 
settlement). (Appellant's Br. at 46-47.) However, such contacts cannot be viewed as a 
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purposeful availment of the protections and benefits of Utah law by Post Kirby, but rather 
were merely the performance of Post Kirby's duties under California law in the 
California Gen-Probe Litigation. As noted above, personal jurisdiction turns on the 
"quality" rather than the "quantity" of contacts with the State. See, e.g., Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992). PostKirby's 
Utah visits or communications during the Gen-Probe Litigation are not qualitatively 
significant because they were ancillary to and in furtherance of the California litigation. 
Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390 ("The communications sent into New Hampshire were 
ancillary to the allegedly negligent non-forum activities55); see also Austad, 823 F.2d at 
226; Biederman v. Sechnader, Harrison, Siegal & Lewis, 765 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. 
Kan. 1991); DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 726. Such contacts were "little more than a 
convenience to the client, who would otherwise have had to travel to55 California. See 
Sher,911F.2datl363. 
Bennett attempts to bolster the significance of such Utah visits by arguing that the 
alleged malpractice occurred during those visits. Specifically, Bennett claims that Post 
Kirby came to Utah in January 1991 to prepare the Fourth Amended Complaint, which 
negligently abandoned the derivative claims. However, Bennett never explains how Post 
Kirby could be held responsible for abandoning derivative claims where Post Kirby was 
retained solely to prosecute a class action rather than derivative litigation. In any event, 
any alleged malpractice related to the Fourth Amended Complaint actually occurred in 
California when the complaint was filed and not in Utah. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390 
n.5; Cote, 796 F.2d at 984; Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 7. Moreover, the Utah visit was merely 
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a convenience to the client (and could have likewise taken place in California). See Sher, 
911 F.2d at 1363 (visits to client's residence insignificant because "little more than a 
convenience to the client"); Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390-91 (communications ancillary to 
non-forum litigation not significant). 
Bennett also argues that Post Kirby allegedly advised him negligently regarding 
settlement during a Utah visit in February 1992. (Appellant's Br. at 46-47.) However, 
the First Circuit rejected a similar claim of personal jurisdiction based on communication 
of a negligent recommendation of settlement to the client's residence. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d 
at 1390-91. Any alleged malpractice in the settlement culminated when the settlement 
was submitted for approval to (and actually approved by) the California Court, and 
Bennett informed the California Court that he was electing to opt out of the settlement. 
Id. 
As both parties argued below, the key issue in personal jurisdiction is the "focal 
point" of the parties' relationship. This principle is illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's 
decision in Far West, where the plaintiff resided in Utah, but the focal point of the 
parties' relationship was a Nevada geothermal project. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants' breach of contract and intentional interference with contract injured the 
plaintiff at its residence in Utah. The Tenth Circuit instead looked to the "focal point of 
the tort and its harm" and the parties' "relationship" to determine if the defendant had 
"purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum's laws." Id. at 1079, 1080. Since 
the "focal point" of the tort, harm, and contractual relationship was Nevada, Utah courts 
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did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants for claims related to that 
relationship. Id. at 1080. 
In the present case, the "focal point" of the Post Kirby-Bennett relationship was 
California, where Post Kirby was retained, the litigation was undertaken, and Bennett 
was allegedly injured when he opted out of the proposed class settlement. Bennett's 
residence in Utah played merely a "fortuitous role in the parties' past dealing." Id. Post 
Kirby did not purposefully avail itself of the protections and benefits of Utah law when it 
was contacted in California and actually represented a class in California litigation. 
c. Bennett's Alleged Injury Occurred in California 
Bennett also alleges that he was injured in the State of Utah. (Appellant's Br. at 
44, 46; R. 1044 (Compl. % 4).) To the contrary, although Bennett may feel the "effects" 
of his alleged injury wherever he chooses to reside, Bennett's alleged injury was 
sustained in California. It was in California that Bennett was allegedly denied his rightful 
recovery in the California Gen-Probe Litigation by allegedly being forced to opt out of 
the litigation rather than accept what he claims was an unreasonably low settlement. See 
Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1390 (the client's "injury occurred when the suit was dismissed"); 
see also Cote, 796 F.2d at 984; Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 11; Twine v. Levy, 746 F. Supp. 
1202, 1206 (E.D. N.Y. 1990); DeVenzeio, 918 P.2d at 728. The state where the "effects" 
of the injury are felt, such as the residence of the plaintiff, is not the location of the injury 
for the purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Sawtelle, 70 F.2d at 1390; Malmo, 939 
F.2d at 537. 
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These principles are consistent with Utah jurisprudence. See Hydroswift Corp. v. 
Louie's Boats & Motors, Inc., 494 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1972) (jurisdiction could not be 
predicated upon the fact that the financial injury for an out-of-state tortious act was felt in 
Utah because that was where the plaintiff resided); cf Far West, 46 F.3d at 1080 
(suffering the "financial effects" of torts in Utah at plaintiffs domicile does not establish 
personal jurisdiction in Utah). Thus, Bennett's injury, if any, from the alleged 
malpractice, arose from and occurred in the California litigation regardless of his place of 
residence. 
d. The Joint Venture Allegation Does Not Create Personal 
Jurisdiction in Utah 
Bennett further claims that Post Kirby allegedly formed a Utah joint venture with 
Jones Waldo in the representation of Utah clients. (Appellant's Br. at 9 n.3, 44-48.) 
Bennett relies on International Leasing, Inc. v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 
1969), for the position that personal jurisdiction is established over individual partners 
where "the individual partners availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business 
activities in Kansas and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws" u[t]hough the 
instrumentality of the partnership." Bennett's argument is wrong for three reasons. 
First, Post Kirby did not form a "joint venture" with Jones Waldo. Bennett cites 
no authority that class action co-counsel are joint venturers for personal jurisdiction 
purposes. In any events, even under the authority cited by Bennett in other contexts, no 
joint venture was formed in this matter because Post Kirby did not have joint and equal 
control with Jones Waldo over the litigation. In Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 
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632 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1993), relied on by Bennett, (Appellant's Br. at 9 n.3), the co-
counsel had an "argument that each attorney would have an equal stake in the outcome of 
the case and there would be joint control of the case," which formed the basis of the 
finding of a joint venture for joint and severability. Id. at 426, 428; see also Armor v. 
Lantz, 535 S.E. 2d 737, 745-46 (W. Va. 2000) ("equal control" of litigation is important 
in finding a joint venture between co-counsel). In the present case, Post Kirby's October 
24, 1990 letter, wherein Post Kirby agreed to act as co-counsel, clearly specifies that 
Jones Waldo would remain "lead counsel" and "continue to have the ultimate decision 
making authority."20 (Appellant's App. 4 at 1.) Thus, Bennett cannot demonstrate that a 
"joint venture" had been formed. 
Second, even if a joint venture had been formed, it would have been a California 
joint venture for the purpose of carrying out activities in California. In International 
Leasing, relied on by Bennett, the Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction over the partnership 
and partners because the partnership had "purposefully availed themselves of the 
privilege of conducting business activities in Kansas," through the rental of equipment 
from plaintiff in Kansas for use in Kansas oil and gas leases. International Leasing, 410 
That letter merely gave Post Kirby the right to "consult[]" with Jones Waldo before 
Jones Waldo made the decisions. (Appellant's App. 4.) In fact, that letter contemplates 
that the parties might be compensated out of any common fund by the court on a loadstar 
(or hourly) basis, rather than a percentage contingency-fee basis, which likewise 
undermines Bennett's claim of a joint venture. Id. ("Inasmuch as this is a class action, 
we have agreed that each firm will keep track of all attorneys' fees incurred, and costs 
and disbursements, which would be submitted to the Court upon any settlement for 
approval as to attorneys' fees"). See, e.g., Harlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 
(9l Cir. 1998) (court can award fees on either loadstar or percentage basis in class 
actions). 
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F.2d at 305. In the present case, any joint venture would have been formed solely to 
prosecute litigation in California (and not in Utah). Thus, the "focal point" of the 
activities of the alleged joint venture would have been California. 
Third, in any event, the mere existence of a California joint venture should not 
subject each alleged joint venturer to personal jurisdiction based on the acts of the other 
joint venturer. See Sher, 911 F.2d at 1376. As the Ninth Circuit stated (interpreting 
California joint venture law): 
The contacts of the partners may establish jurisdiction over the 
partnership. This is so because each partner acts as an agent of the 
partnership when carrying on the business of the partnership in the 
usual way. However, while each partner is generally an agent of the 
partnership for the purpose of business, he is not ordinarily an agent 
of his partners. Thus, a partner's actions may be imputed to the 
partnership for the purposes of establishing minimum contacts, but 
ordinarily may not be imputed to the other partners. 
Id. at 1376. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE BAR 
ORDER-RELATED CLAIMS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
Bennett claims that Post Kirby allegedly committed abuse of process, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and "deceit" when it obtained and enforced the Bar Order 
in California court. Inasmuch Post Kirby no longer had any professional relationship 
with Bennett at the time of the Bar Order, Bennett premises jurisdiction on the assertion 
that he was injured in Utah by the Bar Order litigation. (R. 1044 (Compl. f 4).) 
As described above, a plaintiff must still establish that a "defendant has 
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum's laws," even in the intentional tort 
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context. Far West, 46 F.3d at 1079; see also id. at 1077-79 (reviewing Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783 (1983)). Purposeful availment turns on the "focal point" of the "tort and its 
harm" and the "relationship" of the parties. Id. at 1080. 
Bennett has argued that service of the Bar Order in Utah permits the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction against Post Kirby. However, the service of legal process arising 
from California litigation on a Utah resident does not establish purposeful availment of 
Utah law, even if the process is claimed to be an abuse of process. On this point, the 
Tenth Circuit in Far West cited with favor the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Wallace 
v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1985). In Wallace, an Indiana plaintiff sued three 
California lawyers in Indiana for malicious prosecution arising out of California 
litigation. The plaintiff argued that the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied 
because "the defendants served interrogatories, requested the production of documents, 
and caused the plaintiff to respond to five complaints in Indiana where the plaintiff 
resides." Id. at 394. The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that "the defendants filed these 
motions on behalf of their clients in a California court pursuant to a California lawsuit, 
and it would be unreasonable to require the defendants to appear in Indiana to defend this 
suit on the basis of such attenuated contacts." Id. The central inquiry was again an 
examination of the "focal point" of the tort and the harm. Id. at 394, 395. 
In the present case, with respect to the Bar Order Litigation, the "focal point" of 
the parties' conduct and relationship was again in California. The Bar Order Litigation 
was instituted and prosecuted in California federal court. Post Kirby's alleged 
misrepresentations were to the California federal court. Although served with the 
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temporary Bar Order in Utah, Bennett appeared and defended the litigation entirely in 
California. When Bennett allegedly violated the Bar Order, Post Kirby sought 
enforcement in a California - not Utah - court. Violation of the Bar Order, wherever it 
might occur, was and would be punished by sanctions in California. The Bar Order 
remains a valid order of the California federal court and is binding on Bennett regardless 
of where he elected to bring his suit: 
Bennett's alleged "emotional" and "reputational" injury from the Bar Order 
Litigation was also centered in and arose out of California. He claims (1) distress from 
being "wrongfully issued a contempt citation" in California federal court; (2) anxiety 
concerning damage to his "personal and professional reputation and career" from the 
contempt citation and the court's "excoriat[ion]" of Bennett in public in her courtroom; 
(3) "fear of incarceration" in California; (4) "fear of the financial consequences of the Bar 
Order and contempt proceedings" in California; and (5) "financial pressure of being 
required to pay costs and attorneys fees" in "defending against... the injunction and 
contempt citation" in California. (R. 1076, 1088 (Compl. fflf 141, 193).) 
Moreover, the very nature of bar orders demonstrates that the "focal point" of that 
litigation was in California. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bar Order because a court 
has the power to protect the "finality" of its own judgments. Thus, Post Kirby had asked 
the California Court, and that court agreed, to enter an order to protect finality of the 
California class action judgment. Violation of that order was punishable by contempt in 
the California Court. The Bar Order would have the same effect and consequences 
regardless of where Bennett elected to file suit. The incidental effect of the Bar Order 
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Litigation on Utah is merely a "fortuitous" event tied to Bennett's decision to file in Utah. 
Cf, Far West, 46 F.3d at 1080. The focal point of the Bar Order Litigation was and had 
to be California and the California judgment. Such contacts are insufficient to establish 
personal jurisdiction in this case. 
D. THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
POST KIRBY WOULD BE UNREASONABLE 
Bennett must also make a prima facie showing that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction would be reasonable and fair. Where, as in this case, Bennett has failed to 
make a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, the court need not evaluate the 
reasonableness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1394. If 
Bennett has made a weak showing of minimum, he must make an "'especially strong 
showing of reasonableness'" to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. (quoting 
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994)). This test 
requires a court to balance "'the fairness to the parties and the interests of the State in 
assuming jurisdiction.'" SII MegaDiamond, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28 (citation omitted). 
The relevant factors include: 
[T]he burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. [The Court] must also 'weigh in its 
determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." 
Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
In the present case, Bennett cannot make an "especially strong" showing of 
reasonableness. Litigation in an out-of-state forum would increase costs and 
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inconvenience on Post Kirby. Moreover, where, as in this case, the claims arise out of 
litigation in another state, Utah has a "far less compelling interest" in the litigation than 
otherwise would be the case. Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395. By contrast, California has a 
significant interest in this litigation, which involves a California law firm, the practice of 
law in California, and orders of courts sitting in California. Bennett can obtain complete 
and efficient relief against Post Kirby in California, especially because California law 
will govern the claims against Post Kirby. Consequently, Bennett cannot overcome his 
nonexistent or weak showing of minimum contacts in Utah, and thus this Court lacks 
personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Based on the foregoing, Post Kirby requests this Court to do the following: 
(1) Dismiss this appeal as untimely with respect to Post Kirby; or 
(2) Affirm the rulings of the district court dismissing Bennett's malpractice 
and bar-order claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Rick B Hoggard 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
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Certificate of Service 
I, Rick B Hoggard, certify that on the 29th day of November, 2001, I served a 
copy of the foregoing upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing 
it to them by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
Daniel G. Moquin 
443 East 2400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
R. Brent Stephens 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
































Michael L. Kirby (050895) 
James R. Lance (147173) 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA 92101-3355 
Telephone No. (619) 231-8666 
Christopher L. Burton (USB #0511) 
Sidney G. Baucom (USB #0247) 
James W. Peters (USB #5131) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone No. (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs (except David D. Bennett) 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
DAVID D. BENNETT, JAMES W. 
BENNETT, LORRAINE J. ENGSTROM, 
MO-VEST, LTD., HAROLD SANBEK, 
ARDEN LUBECK, and FRANKLIN 
REED BENNETT, SARA LIU, and 
ALICE LIU, individually, and 




THOMAS H. BOLOGNA, THOMAS H. 
ADAMS, HOWARD C. BIRNDORF, 
MALIN BURNHAM, BROOK H. BYERS, 
DAVID F. HALE, CHARLES M. 
HARTMAN, LEWIS H. SARETT, and 
DAVID E. KOHNE, GEN-PROBE 
INCORPORATED, a Delaware 
Case No. 90-1183-C (LgBj.^ >%g) 
TEMPORARY BAR ORDER; ORDER 
































ACQUISITION USA INC., a 
Delaware corporation; CHUGAI 
HOLDING USA INC., a Delaware 
corporation; and CHUGAI 
PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD., a 
Japanese corporation, 
Defendants. 
Having duly considered the ex parte papers submitted in 
support of the Temporary Bar Order and for good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That David D. Bennett and his agents or attorneys 
shall be, pending a hearing on this matter, enjoined and 
restrained from initiating or maintaining any lawsuit against 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough and its attorneys (including 
Christopher L. Burton and Sidney G. Baucom) or any other class 
counsel which in any way involves: 
a. The sufficiency or fairness of the class action 
settlement in the above-entitled action; 
b. The competency of class counsel and counsel's 
legal services on behalf of the class in the 
above-entitled action; 
c. The award of fees and costs to class counsel 
from the class action settlement fund; 
d. The award of additional compensation to any of 
named Plaintiffs. 
2. This Order does not bar or restrain David D. Bennett 






















Probe shareholder, except to the extent such claims have been 
previously adjudicated by this Court. 
3. A hearing shall be held at /Q*AO J^.m. on July n , 
1994 in this Court, at 940 Front Street, San Diego, California 
to show cause why this Order shall not be made permanent. 
4. David D. Bennett may file (and shall personally 
serve) any opposition papers by 4:00 p.m. on July 7, 1994. 
5. If David D. Bennett wishes a continuance of the 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause, with the Temporary Bar 
Order remaining in effect, the Court is willing to grant such a 
continuance. 
DATED: 
Honorable Louisa S. Porter 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
DAVID D. BENNETT, JAMES W. 
BENNETT, LORRAINE J. ENGSTROM, 
MO-VEST. LTD., HAROLD SANBECK, 
ARDEN LUBECK, and FRANKLIN REED 
BENNETT. SARA LIU, and ALICE LIU, 
individually, and on behalf of Gen-Probe 




THOMAS H. BOLOGNA, THOMAS H. 
ADAMS, HOWARD C. BIRNDORF, 
MALIN BURNHAM, BROOK H. BYERS, 
DAVID F. HALE, CHARLES M. 
HARTMAN, LEWIS H. SARETT, and 
DAVID E. KOHNE, GEN-PROBE 
INCORPORATED, a Delaware 
corporation; CHUGAI ACQUISITION 
USA INC., a Delaware corporation; 
CHUGAI HOLDING USA INC., a 
Delaware corporation; and CHUGAI 
PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD., a 
Japanese corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 90-1183K(POR) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PERMANENT BAR ORDER 
The motion of class counsel - Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough and Post 
Kirby Noonan & Sweat - for permanent bar order against David D. Bennett, came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judith N. Keep, United States Chief District 
Judge presiding, on Tuesday, September 6, 1994. Class counsel were represented by 
Michael L. Kirby of Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat. Christopher L. Burton, Sidney G. 
Baucom and James W. Peters of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough were also 
present in Court. David D. Bennett was represented by David L Sanders and R. Priya 
Seshachari. David D. Bennett was also present in Court. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda and declarations submitted by both sides and having heard 
oral argument, for good cause showing, issued an oral ruling which is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
For the reasons stated in the oral ruling, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
motion of class counsel for a permanent bar order is granted, to the effect that 
temporary bar order, issued by the Honorable Louisa S. Porter in this case on July 5, 
1994. now becomes permanent. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. J 
DATED: c t t t £j)L\Cl'>t 
cc: 
Michael L. Kirby 
Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA 92101-3355 
Christopher L Burton 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David L. Sanders 
Law Offices of David L Sanders 
400 East, 425 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
R. Priya Seshachari 
Taft Securities Litigation, Inc. 
79 "A" Street, Suite 106 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
JUDITH N. KEEP.Yttfcf Judge 
United States DistrbtlCourt 
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(Cite as: 87 F.3d 1317, 1996 WL 328792 (9th Cir. 
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides 
that dispositions other than opinions or orders 
designated for publication are not precedential and 
should not be cited except when relevant under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or 
collateral estoppel. 
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a 
"Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" 
appearing in the Federal Reporter.) 
David D. BENNETT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
GEN-PROBE, INC.; Thomas H. Bologna, et al, 
Defendants, 
and 
Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, Appellee. 
No. 95-55306. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
Argued and Submitted April 10, 1996. 
Decided June 14, 1996. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California, D.C. No. 




Before: SCHROEDER, LEAVY, Circuit Judges 
and TRIMBLE [FN*] District Court Judge. 
FN* Honorable James T. Trimble, Jr., United 
States District Judge for the Western District of 
Louisiana, sitting by designation. 
MEMORANDUM [FN**] 
FN** This disposition is not appropriate for 
publication and may not be cited to or by the courts 
of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 
36-3. 
**1 Plaintiff-appellant, David D. Bennett is a 
.))) 
former named plaintiff in Bennett v. Bologna, a 
securities fraud class action that was settled after 
Bennett opted out. Bennett appeals the district 
court's issuance of a permanent bar order obtained 
by counsel for the plaintiff class. 
The class counsel who obtained the bar order argue 
initially on appeal that this court lacks jurisdiction to 
review the bar order because Bennett did not file a 
timely notice of appeal. Browder v. Director, 434 
U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (timely notice of appeal both 
mandatory and jurisdictional). Bennett's notice of 
appeal was, however, timely filed with respect to 
the district court's denial of Bennett's motion, 
argued pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
59(e) and 60, "to set aside order, and alternatively, 
... to alter or amend order." Because the district 
court's denial of Bennett's motion addresses the 
merits of Bennett's arguments, this court reaches the 
merits of Bennett's appeal. 
On the merits of his appeal, Bennett contends that 
since no federal court has jurisdiction to hear the 
underlying state malpractice and breach of contract 
claims he is seeking to litigate in Utah, the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the 
bar order. The district court has jurisdiction, 
however, to enter orders to preserve and protect the 
"fruits and advantages" of its judgment. See Local 
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934); 
Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 
Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1524 (9th Cir.1983) ("[a] 
district court retains jurisdiction to enforce the 
judgments it enters" and may reinforce res judicata 
or collateral estoppel via injunction). Thus, the 
district court had jurisdiction to enter a bar order to 
protect the finality of its class action judgment. The 
issue is whether this bar order serves such a 
purpose. The district court may not prevent a Utah 
court from litigating malpractice and breach of 
contract issues relating to appellee law firm's 
representation of Bennett, because such litigation 
does not endanger or affect the "fruits and 
advantages" of the district court's judgment settling 
the underlying class action. Further, in adjudicating 
Bennett's malpractice and breach of contract claims, 
a Utah court may examine the adequacy of the class 
settlement, but only insofar as that settlement sheds 
light on appellee law firm's representation of 
Bennett. The district court was entitled to protect 
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
87 F.3d 1317 (Table) 
(Cite as: 87 F.3d 1317, 1996 WL 328792, **1 (9th Cii 
the district court's own judgment, and thereby 
ensure its finality so that the class members would 
still receive the same settlement; the class defendant 
would remain obligated to pay the same settlement, 
and Bennett would remain a non party with no right 
to any share of that settlement. Cf. Samuel C. 
Ennis & Co., Inc. v. Woodmar Realty Co., 542 
F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir.1976) (injunction proper where 
state action, if successful, would nullify the federal 
bankruptcy court's order of distribution). 
**2 The bar order contains a disclaimer that it does 
not "restrain David D. Bennett from pursuing solely 
his individual claims...." This should not be 
construed to limit Bennett to pursuit of his individual 
claims against the original class action defendant and 
to preclude any challenge to counsel's handling of 
Page 117 
.(Cal.))) 
the class action. The district court's order must be 
construed narrowly to prevent any collateral attack 
upon the class action judgment and its finality as 
between the parties to that judgment. We hold, 
however, that the bar order cannot be construed to 
prevent Bennett from litigating issues in his 
malpractice and breach of contract actions that relate 
to class counsels' handling of the class action, so 
long as such litigation does not undermine the 
finality of class action judgment. The order, as so 
construed, is therefore AFFIRMED. 
Any further appellate proceedings in this matter, 
including any appeals from a contempt order, shall 
be referred to this panel. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Third Judicial District 
A I 
James S. Jardine (1647A) 
Rick B. Hoggard (5088A) 
Arthur B. Berger (6490A) 
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, 
Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID D. BENNETT 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH et al., 
Defendants. 
RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT 
ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN 
& SWEAT, LLP, MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
INDIVIDUALLY 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Civil No. 940908220 
The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & 
Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, came on for oral argument 
before the Court on October 25, 1999. James S. Jardine and Rick B. Hoggard of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker appeared on behalf of these defendants, R. Priya Seshachari of Taft Securities Litigation, P.C, 
and James N. Barber appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Having considered the argument of counsel 
and the memoranda and supporting material submitted by each party, the Court notified the parties by 




Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the 
analytical points and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, 
1. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, 
Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, is granted on all 
claims asserted against them. 
2. All claims asserted against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. 
Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, in the Fourth Amended Complaint are dismissed 
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those parties. 
3. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment on the claims 
against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, 
individually, because the jurisdictional basis for dismissal of the claims against these defendants is 
wholly separate from the substantive claims asserted against the other defendants, and from the issues 
raised by the other defendants' pending motions to dismiss those claims. 
4. The Court directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. ^^ 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day of 
October, 2000, commencing at the hour of 2:00 p.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: JAMES N. BARBER 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Broadway, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
Attorney at Law 
443 East 2400 South 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is 
4 Case No. 940908220. 
5 Let's start by having counsel identify themselves 
6 for the record. 
7 MR. BARBER: James N. Barber for the plaintiff, 
8 David Bennett. 
9 MR. MOQUIN: Dan Moquin for plaintiff, David 
10 Bennett. 
11 MS. SANGER: Priya Seshachari-Sanger for 
12 plaintiff, David Bennett. 
13 MR. HOGGARD: Rick Hoggard for the Post, Kirby 
14 defendants. 
15 MR. STEPHENS: Brent Stephens for the Jones, Waldo 
16 defendants. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Barber, you may go forward. 
18 MR. BARBER: Thank you. 
19 Your Honor, I have marked copies of the—some of 
20 the primary cases we intend to refer to. May I hand them— 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MR. BARBER-. Your Honor, this is a motion for the 
23 Court to rule on what we believe was a Rule 59 motion filed 
24 in this—February of this year, after the entry of the first 
25 judgment in this case, but before the entry of the second 
Page 28571 
A P P E A R A N C E S (Continuing) 
PRIYA SESHACHARI-SANGER 
Attorney at Law 
Wells Fargo Bank 
Seventh Floor 
MACA0149-074 
San Francisco, California 
For the Defendants: RICK B. HOGGARD 
Attorney at Law 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-
0385 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Attorney at Law 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
* * * 
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1 and to rule on a 60(b) motion in connection with the second 
2 judgment that was—was entered. 
3 We believe that relevant to the disposition of 
4 these motions is the time that was involved in the factual 
5 things that occurred here by reason of which we have— 
6 plaintiff has been so courteous as to prepare a time line 
7 that I think will put this into context quickly. 
8 THE COURT.- And let me say, ITve—I have reviewed 
9 that time line in—in detail, at least up to the May 10th 
10 date anyway. 
11 MR. BARBER: Al l right. 
12 THE COURT: So, I'm—I'm familiar, I believe, with 
13 what you1 re going to tell me in this regard. 
14 MR. BARBER: Well, not much occurred after May 
15 10th, except that it's a critical day because that's when 
16 the plaintiff finally found out that judgments had been 
17 entered in identical form on February 11th and February 28th 
18 of 2000 and which led us for the first time to conclude that 
19 we needed to get something moving in order to protect our 
20 position. 
21 Also important is the fact that plaintiff filed a 
22 Rule 5—60 motion alluding to the February 28th judgment 
23 within 90 days of the entry of that judgment and at the same 
24 time, asked the Court to rule on what we believe is a Rule 
25 59 motion and then we went ahead and filed a notice of 
Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320 Page 1 - Page ' 
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1 appeal which was 29 days after—not after the judgments had 
2 been entered, but after we learned of their entry. 
3 The difficulty being now that unless the Court 
4 provides us some relief here, of course, that notice of 
5 appeal is going to be outside the limits imposed by the 
6 Rules of Appellate Procedure and our appeal will be barred. 
7 And that's why this is a critical motion. 
8 We believe that as a result of a series of 
9 circumstances, the real issue here is one of fundamental 
10 fairness and due process which of course, the rules of 
11 procedures and the rules of judicial administration are 
12 designed to embody and define for the benefit, both of the 
13 Court and—and practitioners before it. And we believe that 
14 given the purpose of those rules, the relief that we've 
15 sought will be warranted. 
16 Our motion on its face asks for, number one, 
17 striking of the February 28th judgment which was identical 
18 to the February 11th judgment essentially as a ministerial 
19 error because it is essentially surplusage to the February 
20 11th judgment that was entered. 
21 The alternative, and we believe there are grounds 
22 for this, is of course for the Court to set them both aside 
23 for the reasons that we'll talk about in a moment. 
24 We then seek a ruling which is critical to the 
25 relief we seek that a pleading designated Plaintiffs Reply 
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1 to Defendants' Response to the Objections to the Minute 
2 Entry entered on January 7th, by which the Court announced 
3 its intention to grant the judgment in favor of the 
4 defendant dismissing the Jones—I mean the Kirby defendants 
5 from the case was entered, that that should be treated as a 
6 Rule 59 motion to amend or alter the judgment because it 
7 was, even though we didn't know it then, in fact filed five 
8 or six days after that February 11th judgment was entered 
9 but within the ten-day period prescribed by the rules. 
10 It was—it was— 
11 THE COURT: Can I ask you a question about that? 
12 MR. BARBER. Sure. 
13 THE COURT: I know I'm going to hear this from the 
14 other side, but I struggle with how, Mr. Barber, with all 
15 due respect, you can stand before me today and in the moving 
16 papers, basically take the position that it's not—that what 
17 you're filing is not a Rule 59 request for relief. And then 
18 stand before me today and orally assert that it is now a 
19 request for Rule 59 ruling. 
20 MR. BARBER: Well, I think, your Honor, that the 
21 answer to that is pretty straightforward and has been dealt 
22 with in the case law. What we call or believe—of course, 
23 the error, our error arises from the fact that when we filed 
24 that, we didn't know that the judgment had been entered. 
25 Had we been advised that the February 11th judgment had been 
Page 7 
1 entered and that—or that our notice of objections to the 
2 January 7th minute entry had been considered by the Court 
3 and ruled upon in any way at all, we would, of course, 
4 designated the pleading otherwise and not included in it the 
5 language that the Court is alluding to. 
6 But the case law makes it pretty clear that it 
7 isn't what you call a pleading that designates what it is, 
8 but actually what it is. And we believe that that pleading 
9 is—has to be deemed to be a Rule 59 motion because it does 
10 things that would be found in such a motion. 
11 In connection with that, we talk about DeBry vs. 
12 Fidelity, which—which contains this language—and in that 
13 case, if it's possible to get in a worse position than we 
14 are, Bob DeBry got himself in it because in that case, 
15 before the Court of Appeals, he was actually arguing that a 
16 pleading that designated much like ours, objections to the 
17 form of a judgment and a request for changes in the findings 
18 was not in fact a Rule 59 or a 52(b) motion. 
19 But—and the Court of Appeals rejected that claim 
20 even though the proponent of the pleading in the lower court 
21 was the one who was arguing for it to not be treated as a 59 
22 motion. But the court said, regardless of how it is 
23 captioned, a motion filed within ten days of entry of a 
24 judgment—and here's the critical language—that questions 
25 the correctness of the court's findings and conclusions, is 
Page 8 
1 properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either 
2 Rules 59(b) or 59(e)~52(b) or 59(e). The substance of a 
3 motion, not its caption, is controlling. 
4 And then he says—the court says, in the instant 
5 case, DeBry's motion in substance requested the trial court 
6 to amend and make additional findings of fact and 
7 conclusions of law, a request recognized by Rule 52(b). And 
8 furthermore, DeBry's motion was timely inasmuch as it was 
9 filed five days after the entry of the judgment. 
10 I believe that a similar holding is found in Reed 
111 vs. Steinfeld, which we've cited in our brief, 915 P.2d 1073 
12 at Page 1077 where the court, once again in describing the 
113 substance of the pleadings, says, in the instant case, the 
114 Reeds claim and we agree— 
15 THE COURT: rm sorry. What paragraph are you on 
16 in that? 
17 MR. BARBER: It's Footnote 2 through 5 on Page 
18 1077. 
19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
20 MR. BARBER: In the instant case, the Reeds claim 
21 and we agree that Steinfeld's November 8 objections to the 
22 proposed findings, conclusions and judgment is—is in 
23 substance a Rule 59 motion inasmuch as it asks the court to 
24 alter its findings and amend its conclusions and the 
25 judgment. 
Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320 Page 5 - Page 8 
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1 In this motion, Steinfeld objected to the trial 
2 court's calculation of damages, of the naming of a 
3 prevailing party in an underlying action—in the underlying 
4 action. He asserts the trial court incorrectly determined 
5 the issue of substantial completion and whether Steinfeld's 
6 lien had been wrongly filed. 
7 Steinfeld1 s motion does more than merely—than 
8 merely the object to—I don't understand that language— 
9 Steinfeld's motion does more than merely the object—I guess 
10 that's a typo—to Reed's proposed findings and judgment. It 
11 urges the court to amend its filings and to alter its legal 
12 conclusions and the judgment. Thus, the time for filing the 
13 notice of appeal was tolled until January 3rd. 
14 Finally, there is similar language found in 
15 Ashley—excuse me, in Riggen vs. Bloundt, Footnote 8—well, 
16 that isn't where it is at all. 
17 It's at the top of Page 1054, three lines down. 
18 Appellate's motion filed several days before the entry of 
19 the amended order and judgment, challenged by the motion and 
20 that's more than—not more than ten days after the entry of 
21 the judgment, is timely under the rules. 
22 That wasn't the exact language I was talking 
23 about. I'm talking about language on Page 1053 under 
24 Footnote 5, 4 and 5, Footnote 4, Paragraph 5 it says there. 
25 It says, the motion improperly labeled as—as one for 
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1 question that had that reply been filed after the entry of 
2 the judgment so that we knew that and had designated a 59(e) 
3 motion that it would be treated as such because it has the 
4 substance required of that kind of a motion. 
5 We believe that under the circumstances of this 
6 case, where essentially all of the parties were operating in 
7 ignorance of the fact, the Court can—can and ought to treat 
8 the motion as such, notwithstanding that on the basis of—of 
9 an incorrect understanding of the facts, the language the 
10 Court alluded to was included in the—in the response. 
11 So, I think that's the best we can do, address 
12 that, but I think it is a correct—a—a—a construction that 
13 complies with the law, with the case law that defines what a 
14 post-judgment motion really is and the fact that our motion 
15 clearly complies with those definitions which are found in 
16 the cases that I've cited to the Court. 
17 Does the Court have further questions about that? 
18 THE COURT: Well, I—I probably will have another 
19 question for you but I'll wait until you—you essentially— 
20 MR. BARBER: rll look forward to it with bated 
21 breath. 
22 Thank you, your Honor. 
23 Of course, the impact of the decision that we've 
24 just been discussing is critical to us because if the Court 
25 isn't able to fashion the relief that we seek here or some 
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1 reconsideration that is in fact a motion for a new trial 
2. extends the tune for appeals under Rule 4(b ) 
J And then it cites a case stating that regardless 
4 of its caption, a motion filed within ten days of entry of 
J the—of the judgment that questions the correctness of the 
0 court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a 
/ post judgment motion under either Rule 52(b) or 59(e) 
O Now, your Honor, we believe that our objections to 
y the January 7th minute entry which we did not know had 
10 already been reduced and entered in the judgment but that Ln 
11 fact had been, came at the conclusion where we filed the 
12 objections, the defendant responded replied to that series 
13 of objections and then we filed a reply to the response 
14 Fortunately, the reply was filed after the 
X J judgment was entered, but it is clearly a an objection to 
1 U the underlying minute entry and thus, the judgment as well, 
17 that questions the court's conclusions which we believe of 
1 O course were in error The conclusion that the minimum 
19 contacts as between the KiTby defendants and Mr Bennett 
20 were sufficient under our long arm statute and 
21 Constitutional constraint* to vest jurisdiction over the 
22 Kirby defendants in this court. 
23 That ruling, implicit in the judgment and -which is 
24 actually the basis of the judgment, is something that we ask 
25 the Court to reconsider and set aside There can be no 
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1 other similar relief that essentially delays the 
2 effectiveness of one or both of the judgments, then we are 
3 going to be denied our right to appeal. 
4 That, of course, is a fundamental right that ought 
5 to be protected unless the plaintiff is negligent in what 
6 he's done. We don't believe the facts establish that kind 
7 of negligence in any way, shape or form. And that the fact 
8 that because of a series of circumstances, both the parties 
9 operated in ignorance of the fact is a justification for the 
10 Court to take a somewhat extraordinary position in this 
11 case, though one that is supported by the case law. 
12 We believe that what the Court ought to do is to 
13 either grant the relief as we have specifically outlined it 
14 in our motion or I think the Court could easily deem our 
15 Rule 59 motion sufficient to have applied to both of the 
16 judgments that are issued here and rule that until this 
17 Court rules on that motion, the judgments, for purposes of 
18 filing the notice of appeal are stayed and have no effect. 
19 The other thing the Court could do, I suppose, I 
20 think it would be more painful and perhaps more difficult, 
21 but could still be done, is to deem the February 28th 
22 judgment the operative judgment here instead of the 
23 redundant February 11th judgment and grant our Rule 60(b) 
24 motion, which is timely filed as to that judgment by setting 
25 it aside for any other reason justifying relief from the 
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1 judgment, which is part of Rule 60(b) or as clerical 
2 mistake 
3 There are two grounds that would permit that to 
4 happen, either one of them would be of assistance to us 
5 because then we could proceed to appeal the substance of the 
6 judgments having timely filed our Rule 60(b) motion Either 
7 way, it is not the form of relief that is so critical to Mr 
8 Bennett, your Honor, but the fact that some relief accord— 
9 be accorded that permits him his right to appeal 
10 There are really three or four legal issues The 
11 first one, we've discussed in some measure and that is, 
12 should our objections to the January 7th minute entry, 
13 coupled with the reply to plaintiffs response to that, too, 
14 which was filed after the entry of the February 11th 
15 judgment be deemed a Rule 59(a) or a Rule—a Rule 52(b) or a 
16 Rule 59 motion 
117 We think for the reasons I've already indicated 
18 that we—that the Court clearly ought to do that, once again 
19 reiterating that it is the substance of the motion, not its 
20 form or what we say it is under a mistaken bebef in the 
21 circumstances of the case, which was essentially misleading 
22 to us That should not govern The substance of that 
23 motion should govern and we believe that it's adequate under 
24 those rules for the reasons that I've quoted from the cases 
25 THE COURT Mr Barber, and this may be an aside, 
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1 it may not be all that significant m resolving these 
2 issues, but isn't it—isn't it accurate also to conclude 
3 that what occurred here—and I'm going to add in a moment 
4 what I think occurred from my perspective, but in filing 
5 what you did file, isn't it fair to say that basically what 
6 you are attempting to do is to file an objection, argue the 
7 full panoply and the full landscape of the—the objections 
8 that you thought were the appropriate way upon which this 
9 Court should rule, have that bite of the apple, and then if 
10 in fact you lost that, then to have the same Rule 59 type 
11 request for relief bite out of the apple, a second time all 
12 over again In practicality and with intellectual honesty, 
13 isn't that what you are doing on behalf of your client or am 
14 I missing something here*? 
15 MR BARBER Well, I~I guess the short answer is, 
16 Sure 
17 THE COURT Okay 
18 MR BARBER We—we wanted to call to the Court's 
19 attention before the judgment was entered, the fact that we 
20 thought it was wrong And—and so, even though we don't 
21 have that ammal under the rules, I think that the motion to 
22 reconsider the objections to the minute entry were in fact 
23 an invitation for the Court to re-think that issue and 
24 change its mind, if it deemed it appropriate 
25 THE COURT Here's—here's the practical—other 
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1 practical problem which I normally hear from the other side, 
2 but I want to hear what your response is, especially in 
3 light of the type of relief that you're requesting This is 
4 what I believe happened in this situation When that first 
5 notice to submit for decision was submitted to me and when I 
6 had before me the objection and response thereto, I clearly 
7 reviewed the objection and the—and the response and—and 
8 the February 11th decision 
9 Shortly thereafter, a subsequent notice to submit 
10 was given to me and I reviewed once again all of the 
11 documents I had in front of me but quite frankly, there was-
12 -there would have been, oh, a little over a two-week passage 
13 of time between, I think the February 11th— 
14 MR BARBER Yeah— 
15 THE COURT and the— 
16 MR BARBER 17 days 
17 THE COURT I simply did not recall, 
18 unfortunately, that I had signed the February 11th judgment, 
19 but the point I'm getting at is, two things occurred here, I 
20 did not recall I signed the February 11th judgment, but 
21 clearly, I reviewed the objections and made a determination 
22 that the objections were not—did not have merit in my—in 
23 my opinion 
24 The second thing that I traditionally do and I 
25 didn't do in this particular situation and I just can't 
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1 explain it, quite frankly, is that ordinarily, I would have 
2 written on the judgment, interlineation, that the objections 
3 were denied I did not do that in this particular case, but 
4 I can assure you as certain as I am sitting in this chair 
5 for right now, when I signed those judgments, I passed 
j 6 judgment on the issues—on the merits of the issues raised 
7 within those objections 
8 Now, in light of that, how would you fashion your 
9 request for relief? 
10 MR BARBER Well, I—I don't really think it 
11 changes it, your Honor, be—for these reasons, and—and you 
12 know, I have full confidence that this Court would not have 
13 entered that judgment without looking at the objections that 
14 had been filed 
15 THE COURT There's no way, as—as contentious and 
16 as btigated as this case has been, that's— 
17 MR BARBER It simply would have been 
18 inappropriate and I don't think you'd have done it, so I 
19 have no— 
20 THE COURT And—and—and in fact, didn't do it on 
21 this particular case, but go ahead 
22 MR BARBER But—but the difficulty is, is that-
23 that doesn't cure the problems that the failure that the 
24 Court alludes to has created for us 
25 Normally, of course, what you would have done is 
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1 one of two things, it seems to me, and—and—and in some 
2 measure, we're misled by the fact that when the Court made 
3 the January 7th minute entry indicating that it was going to 
4 grant judgment to the Kirby defendants, it wrote a written 
5 minute entry, it placed it in the record and the record will 
6 disclose that the clerk was instructed to file and send to 
7 us a copy of the minute entry, to give us notice that that 
8 had been done 
9 So, we assumed that that's the Court's modus 
10 operandi 
11 THE COURT Well, that's because that's a 
12 document, that is a document originating with the Court, 
13 the—the Court originally created that document 
14 MR BARBER Sure And I can understand that 
15 THE COURT Another—another scenario is when 
16 documents are presented for my signature, especially when I 
17 know that I've reviewed objections, if m fact, the 
18 judgment, for example, itself, does not contain a mailing 
19 certificate, I'm just suggesting this to you and I'm not 
20 making this as an excuse, but because of the volumes we deal 
21 with-
22 MR BARBER Oh, SUTC 
23 THE COURT that—that's an issue that can get 
24 by me, clearly 
25 MR BARBER Sure 
Page 18 
1 THE COURT Because there is some reliance, when 
2 necessary, there's reliance upon counsel to provide that 
3 type of notice 
4 MR BARBER Well, of course, and we have a rule 
5 that requires that Rule 58(a) says that when a judgment's 
6 entered, plaintiff s counsel is obligated—or the 
7 defendant's counsel is obligated to notify us of it, 
8 unfortunately—and—and we concede, though having argued and 
9 prayed otherwise, that—that that does not delay the 
10 effectiveness of the judgment, that failure But what we do 
11 have is synergistic errors that contribute to the fact that 
12 defendant—that plaintiff has been denied due process, in a 
13 sense because, number one, the Court didn't make a minute 
14 entry that it had ruled on the objections prior to entering 
15 the February 11th judgment— 
16 THE COURT Because I—also let me note because I 
17 thought that comparing the objections and the judgment was 
18 so blatantly obvious that I thought any reasonable person 
19 would construe that the objections had been overruled in 
20 light of my sig—signing the judgment 
21 MR BARBER Well, sure, and there's a case about 
22 that, your Honor, you know, and I guess we might as well 
23 discuss it now It's that— 
24 THE COURT I just didn't think it was—I didn't 
25 think it was fairly debatable after I signed the judgment-
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1 MR BARBER Sure 
2 THE COURT that I passed judgment on the 
3 objections I'm not— 
4 MR BARBER Well, a child of three can see that 
5 if you consider them, you rejected them when you read the 
6 judgment There's no problem with that 
7 But the—the difficulty we have is that we didn't 
8 get the notice that you'd done any of it That's our 
9 problem You know, if—if you had either entered a minute 
10 entry saying your objections are overruled or had the Court 
11 or counsel sent us a copy of the February 11th judgment, we 
12 would have simply filed a Rule 59 motion or a notice of 
13 appeal That would have been simple 
14 THE COURT But you're not taking the position, 
15 are you, that I have some statutory or—or other authority 
16 requiring me to do that, are you*? 
17 MR BARBER NO NO I think you ought to give 
18 us notice when you rule on motions and I think that's your 
19 habit and I think that we relied on that habit and—and 
20 you're entitled to depend on counsel to give us notice of 
21 the judgment Unfortunately, he can't do it either, if he 
22 doesn't know about it 
23 So, we're sitting out here in our offices not 
24 knowing, either of us, that the Court has ruled and so we 
25 sit there and take no action for three months, well, 
I Page 20 
1 unfortunately, it was 89 days and then counsel finally gets 
2 together and finds out that the judgment's entered and he 
3 gave us notice of it immediately, by which time, the 60(b) 
4 motion on the 28th of February judgment is almost passed, 
5 the 60(b) period on the February 11th judgment has passed 
6 and the statutory 30-day period for filing a notice of 
7 appeal has passed And so we are junsdictionaUy deprived 
8 of our right to appeal 
9 Now, this business about implicit overruling, you 
10 know, when the Court, as I indicated, it didn't take much to 
11 figure out you'd rejected those—those motions when you— 
12 when you granted the judgment and would have no objection 
13 about that if we had known that you had either rejected them 
14 or entered the judgment, which we didn't But we don't 
15 believe that—that a—merely signing that judgment is a—is 
16 an implicit overruling of the order because, I think it's 
17 the Morgan case that counsel has cited about that, okay, I'm 
18 sorry, it's Reagan, Reagan vs Bloundt 
19 In that case, the matter is dealt with in a 
20 footnote It's—and—and the Court of Appeals holds—it 
21 says that a motion made prior to the entry of a judgment 
22 that is not disposed of either expressly or by necessary— 
23 necessary impbcation by the judgment suspends a running of 
24 the time for taking an appeal until the court disposes of 
25 the motion 
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1 The mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent 
2 with but silent regarding a post-trial pre-judgment motion 
3 does not dispose of the motion by necessary implication 
4 unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the trial 
5 court considered and rejected the motion. 
6 Now, I don't have any doubt that you considered 
7 and rejected the motion, but I don't think that the 
8 circumstances that were available to counsel and I about the 
9 fact that you had done that necessarily indicate that you 
10 did because we didn't know you'd entered the judgment. If 
11 we had notice of the judgment, then we could have said, 
12 well, dollars to donuts, Judge Medley has rejected those— 
13 those objections, but where we don't get the judgment, we 
14 have no way of knowing that. 
15 And so absent information that either of those 
16 actions had been taken, we sat there and let critical time 
17 periods under the rules expire and that's the problem. We 
18 once again have a combination of circumstances. The Court's 
19 action, of course, had you interlineated the action, he—or-
20 -or the judgment to say—and then I would have expected you 
21 to do, I've seen that lots of times. The Court will say, 
22 you know, based on the—the trial or the cause or the 
23 hearing and good cause appearing and the court having 
24 considered and rejected the objections thereto filed by the 
25 plaintiff, judgment is entered as follows. That—that would 
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1 have been normal and ordinary; but in this case, even that 
2 wouldn't have helped, your Honor, because we didn't get the 
3 judgment and so I have no way to respond to it. 
4 The reason I think that this Reagan vs. Bloundt 
5 case isn't dispositive of that implicit overruling issue is 
6 that Reagan vs. Bloundt—I think this is the case, I read— 
7 I've read the cite out of there and I don't think that's the 
8 one I'm looking for. The one I'm looking for is in Morgan 
9 vs. Morgan. And this is down in a footnote. 
10 In that case, the trial court issued a minute 
11 entry granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, 
12 dismissing both parties' claims and adjudicating plaintiff 
13 as the sole owner of the site. Defendant filed an objection 
14 to plaintiff s proposed order to which plaintiff filed a 
15 response. 
16 Though the trial court did not express rule on 
17 defendant's objection, it did sign plaintiff's proposed 
18 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff. 
19 In a—in a footnote, Footnote 1 to this statement 
20 of the facts, the court—the Court of Appeals says, As a 
21 threshold matter, defendant argues that the summary judgment 
22 was not a final order because her objection thereto were 
23 (sic) not expressly ruled upon. And in some measure, that's 
24 our argument here. 
25 Defendant submitted timely objections to 
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1 plaintiffs proposed order under Rule 4-504-2 of the Code of 
2 Judicial Administration which provides that such objections 
3 be submitted within five days after service of the proposed 
4 order. After the five-day period expired, the trial court 
5 signed the plaintiffs proposed order without expressly 
6 ruling on defendant's objections. 
7 The objections were before the trial court; 
8 therefore, we believe the court implicitly denied 
9 plaintiffs objections. In any event, the time for—of 
10 filing of a notice of appeal begins to run when the judgment 
11 is entered. 
12 And that's essentially what the Court just said to 
13 me, that—that because they were there and because you 
14 considered they should be deemed impliedly to have been 
15 overruled. 
16 There's a problem, however, with recitation of 
17 this case as authority for that. Number one, there is no 
18 description in that footnote or elsewhere in the case of the 
19 nature of the objections that were filed to the entry of the 
20 judgment. And therefore, we cannot know whether that is— 
21 was a—were objections that are just to the form of the 
22 judgment or otherwise or whether they were objections which, 
23 after filed—if filed after the judgment had been entered, 
24 would have been deemed Rule 52 or 59 motions. 
25 In this case, we are adamant that our—that the 
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1 nature of our objections were such as to challenge the 
2 judgment of the Court and both the legal and factual 
3 conclusions that were expressed by the entry of the 
4 judgment. 
5 And of course, we are also concerned that the 
6 Court didn't include findings of fact or conclusions of law, 
I 7 which we think are required as a precondition to an 
8 effective judgment or certainly one that can be appealed. 
9 But in—in the—based on the failure of the Morgan 
10 vs. Morgan case, to give us facts that indicate that the 
11 objections that that case was alluding to, were of the sort 
12 that would otherwise have been dealt with as Rule 59 or 52 
13 motions, makes the Court in—the case inapposite and it is 
14 not authority for the proposition that the plaintiffs claim 
15 here. 
16 Your Honor, the—the—unfortunately, the issues 
17 are kind of complicated because you can seek to many kinds 
18 of relief, but the answer is clear to us and that is, that 
19 as a result of a—a series of circumstances, certainly the 
20 failure of notice under Rule 59(a), which we concede isn't 
21 the fault of the defendant's counsel, because he didn't know 
22 about the judgment either; but the silence of the Court in 
23 advising counsel that things were happening that triggered 
24 time demands of us under the rules of procedure, coupled 
25 with the fact that he didn't know about it either and 
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1 therefore, couldn't do his duty under the rules, would make 
2 it inappropriate for this Court to fail to grant a relief 
3 which would give us an opportunity to file a timely notice 
4 of appeal 
5 As I indicated, there are a number of ways that 
6 we—that that could be done We've suggested one of them 
7 The Court can elect others I think maybe the easiest way 
8 would simply be to say, yes, it is a Rule 59 motion, vis-a-
9 vis the February 11th judgment, the second judgment is 
10 essentially surplusage and should be stricken and—and 
11 therefore, no judgment should be deemed to have been entered 
12 for purposes of triggering our obligation to file a notice 
13 of appeal until now, when the Court, after having listened 
14 to the arguments at this hearing, makes an order denying 
15 that motion and letting us know that it's done that 
16 That's the optimum result as far as I can tell and 
17 one of the varieties of that relief that we have sought, I 
18 think would be appropriate to prevent what we bebeve would 
19 be fundamentally unfair imposition upon the plaintiff here, 
20 which would be deprive him of his right to appeal 
21 We think the case—the—the—you know, of course, 
22 any time you appeal, you don't think the court was 
23 necessarily right m the judgment, but we think that there 
24 are close circumstances in this case that—that suggest 
25 that—that an appellate court would revisit those issues and 
! Page 26 
1 we bebeve we really ought to have the opportunity to 
2 present them there 
3 Court have other questions'? 
4 THE COURT I don't, Mr Barber 
5 MR BARBER Thank you 
6 MR HOGGARD Your Honor, the facts in this matter 
7 are really not in dispute and have been fully described by 
8 Mr Barber and based upon the comments of the Court, it does 
9 seem fairly clear that the Court had before it, the 
10 objections and the response and did in fact consider those 
11 objections and responses to the form of the order and denied 
12 them and intended to deny them on the entry of the February 
13 11th judgment, in which case, the subsequent judgment would 
14 be superfluous as ruled by Mr Barber 
15 The question is, does he have a right under Rule 
16 58, 59 or 60 to get relief from that judgment and the 
17 primary issue that's been argued is the Rule 59 and that has 
18 two steps, the analysis, and he must satisfy both steps 
19 Step one, his objections must be considered to be 
20 a Rule 59 motion If not, it doesn't toll the period of 
21 appeal 
22 And then number two, that motion still must be 
23 pending, because if it's been resolved, he didn't file his 
24 appeal within 30 days of the resolution of that motion 
25 So, the first step is, was—was his objection a 
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1 Rule 59 motion? And Mr Barber's argument may be a bttle 
2 bit different if the—if the facts were a little bit 
3 different None of the cases cited by Mr Barber deal with 
4 the situation where the plaintiff affirmatively disclaims 
5 reliance on Rule 59 or 52 on the objection 
6 And the Court is correct in assuming and it's kind 
7 of ironic that if it had been—if the Court had denied the 
8 motion and that notice had been given to the plaintiff, the 
9 plaintiff then would have turned around and probably filed 
10 another Rule 52 or 59 motion, which would not have been 
11 effective because he'd already done it once and the rule 
12 doesn't allow him to do it twice, and he would have lost his 
13 right to appeal if he had done what he intended to do in the 
14 first place 
15 And so it's the factor of affirmative disclaimer 
16 which distinguishes these other cases This isn't a 
17 situation where you say, oh, I just miss-cited the rule or I 
18 put on the wrong caption You affirmatively disclaimed 
19 reliance on the rule that would give you the rebef from the 
20 judgment that's required 
21 The second issue is, has the court ruled on the 
22 Rule 59 motion, if it were m fact a Rule 59 motion And 
23 the Court has indicated that it has in fact considered and 
24 ruled upon that and that's a kind of unusual circumstance 
25 'cause in most of these cases which deal with denial by 
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1 necessary implication, it's the Court of Appeals who's 
2 trying to look back and decide for itself, did the court 
3 actually rule on it? And here, the Court has said it has 
4 done so 
5 Although the necessary impbcation rule still is 
6 applicable because in a sense, the plaintiff has to also 
j 7 know that the Court ruled upon the motion and so you still 
8 look at the surrounding circumstances, did the surrounding 
9 circumstances indicate that the Court did have before it the 
10 objections, did m fact rule and deny on those when it 
11 entered into the order And that's the test The mere 
12 entry of the order doesn't necessarily by itself do that, 
13 you have to look at the surrounding circumstances 
14 Now, Mr Barber has cited the Reagan case to you 
15 and said that's the general rule and that's the case that 
16 ought to be followed The facts in that case are 
17 significantly different than this one In that case, a 
18 judgment was entered and then the prevaibng party, a few 
19 days later, submitted an amended judgment and order The 
20 losing party then filed an objection and the court signed 
21 the amended judgment before any further briefing was 
22 completed on the objection 
23 And the appellate court, looking back, said, 
24 there's no evidence that the court was even aware of the—of 
25 the proposed—of the objections, because the fibng of the 
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1 objections and the filing of the order were done wholly 
2 separated. It could have been just as easy that the | 
3 proposed order had gotten to the court but the filing of the 
4 objections had not and there was no further briefing that 
5 would have called that to the attention of the court. 
6 By contrast, the Morgan v. Morgan decision is very 
7 applicable because there, they do describe what was going 
8 on. The court entered a minute entry granting summary 
9 judgment. The proposed order was prepared and submitted to 
10 the other side. The other side filed objections. The 
11 prevailing party filed a response to the objections and it 
12 was after all the briefing was done that the party—after 
13 the response was filed, that the court went in and then 
14 signed the proposed order, which is exactly what happened 
15 here. 
16 And the court said, the appellate court, looking 
117 back, said, well, it's clear that since the response was 
18 before the court and the only way the proposed order got to 
19 the court is in connection with the objection process, that 
20 it is clear that it had it before it and that it was ruled 
21 upon and disposed of. 
22 Mr. Barber tries to distinguish the case by 
23 arguing, well, we don't know if it—what the nature of the 
24 objections were. That's unimportant. Because the argument 
25 was that whatever the nature of the objections, they made 
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1 the order non-final, therefore, it tolled the period of 
2 appeal. So, it was the type of objection that would have 
3 rendered the order to be non-final, such as a Rule 52 or 
4 Rule 59, it doesn't matter what it was. All that's 
5 important is that the circumstances must indicate that the 
6 court had notice of the motions and was in fact denying 
7 them. 
8 And in this case, the facts were even stronger 
9 than in Morgan, because the only way the Court got the 
10 proposed judgments was in connection with the briefing on 
11 the order, or on the objections. The first time a proposed 
12 judgment was sent—given to the Court was when it was 
13 attached to, as conceded here, attached to the response, 
14 proposed Kirby's response to the objections. 
15 And the response said, Because the objections are 
16 ill-founded, the Court, as a consequence, should sign the 
17 order which is accompanying hereto. So, the order was 
18 submitted to the Court only with the response to the 
19 objections. 
20 And then the second order was submitted with the 
21 express notice to submit for decision, which again said, 
22 since the issue's fully been briefed, here's the order, you 
23 ought to sign it. So, the only way the Court got the order 
24 was in connection with the briefing of the objections. And 
25 so the mere fact that the Court got the proposed judgment 
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1 indicates the Court had the objections and the briefing on 
2 the objections before. 
3 So, under those circumstances, this cannot be I 
4 considered an unresolved Rule 59 motion, so the plaintiff 
5 must look at other avenues for relief, Rule 58 or Rule 60. 
6 Now, the plaintiff has asserted Rule 58, but I 
7 believe that in the reply and in this argument, they've 
8 conceded that Rule 58(a) doesn't give them the relief they 
9 want because it doesn't affect the time for appeal. 
10 So that the issue has to be Rule 60; however, the 
11 plaintiff has conceded in its reply brief, twice, in fact, 
12 that the timing periods under Rule 60(b) had apparently 
13 expired and that's why they were focusing on this new trial 
14 argument. 
15 For example, in the reply memo on Page 2, after 
16 stating that they're seeking the equitable relief because 
17 the entry of those judgments deprived him of his right under 
18 Rule 60 to move for relief from the judgments, on the last 
19 line it says, By the time the notice of the judgments was 
20 received on or about May 10th, 2000, the time limits 
21 contained in those provisions appear to have expired. 
22 And then the same statement is made again on Page 
23 4. During that intervening period, time constraints for 
24 seeking relief from the judgments under Rule 59 and 60 of 
25 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and statutory rights to 
Page 32, 
1 appeal the judgments appear to have expired. 
I 2 And the issue of whether or not they got notice 
3 under Rule 58 doesn't apply where there's a specific time 
4 limit such as the 90-day limit under Rule 60(b). It's not 
5 an equitable circumstance that allows the Court to ignore 
6 the expiration of those time periods. 
7 So, overall, it wasn't a Rule 59 motion. If it 
8 was, the Court—clearly the circumstances should have 
9 indicated to them that the Court, by signing the judgment, 
10 had denied the motion, and under Utah case law, the Morgan 
11 case, the appellate court looking back, even without the 
12 Court's statement here, would reach the same result because 
13 the proposed judgment came in connection with the briefing 
14 process on the—on the objections. 
15 Next, the Rule 58(a) doesn't help them because the 
16 rule expressly says that doesn't affect the time for appeal. 
17 And they've disclaimed the timeliness of any Rule 60(b) 
18 motion—60(b)(1), which is what this would have to be. 
19 This is an unfortunate circumstance and to the 
20 extent that Post, Kirby's counsel bears the responsibility, 
21 we apologize to the Court. There is some confusion, but the 
22 problem here is that the rules—they're saying, denied due 
23 process and there are two answers to that. Number one, in 
24 the Lincoln Benefit case, cited by the—Post, Kirby in its 
25 brief, the court rejected that argument where, when they did 
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1 get notice, the losing party did get notice of the entry of 
2 judgment, if they still could have filed a timely Rule 60 
3 motion, their due process rights haven't been violated. 
4 And under their—they didn't get much time, but 
5 that's why it was faxed and hand-delivered, the notice of 
6 judgment was faxed and hand-delivered to counsel, was to 
7 give them whatever—give them the most time they could have 
8 to file a Rule 60(b) motion, to give them their rights. 
9 And secondly, the fundamental issue cited in the 
10 cases relied upon by Mr. Barber, is that regardless of what 
11 the court did, regardless of what Post, Kirby's counsel on 
12 giving notice, Mr. Barber himself has an independent duty to 
13 monitor the docket. 
14 In the Reeves case, which was cited to the Court, 
15 the Utah Court of Appeals stated, a party to a lawsuit is on 
16 constructive notice of the contents of the court record and 
17 has a duty to be aware of what the trial court does. In the 
18 instant case, although he had not yet received notice of 
119 entry of judgment, Steinfeld was chargeable with such 
20 notice. 
21 In some sense, it's a harsh rule, but it's one 
22 that protects the finality of the judgments and on that 
23 basis, we believe that the motion ought to be denied. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
25 MR. MOQUIN: Your Honor, can we have just a 
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1 minute? 
2 MR. BARBER: Okay. Go ahead. 
3 MR. MOQUIN: Your Honor, I think part of the 
4 confusion is we're labeling, the difference is opposing 
5 counsel would like to say that this is a Rule 59. We've 
6 never said that this was a Rule 59, in our reply, we said 
7 that that wasn't a 59. We didn't say the reply wasn't a 
8 Rule 59, we said this was not a Rule 59. 
9 We firmly believe that this, under case law is the 
10 Rule 59 motion. Now, that motion— 
11 THE COURT: No, I—I'm not confused about that. 
12 MR. MOQUIN: Okay. Now—now, when they tried to 
113 say it's important to the time line, when they tried to say 
14 that—they tried to say in their—their briefs, that this is 
15 a—that this dealt with our Rule 59 motion, we don't believe 
16 that at all. 
17 If—if the Court dealt with our Rule 59 motion, it 
18 would have had to deal with our Rule 59 motion right here. 
19 Now, if it dealt with our Rule 59 motion right here, we're 
20 well—we're within then the 90 days for the Rule 60(b). 
21 We think the reply memorandum is a Rule 59 motion 
22 as a matter of law, based on Reagan, Reeves and DeBry 
23 because intent is not dispositive, not only is it 
24 dispositive, we don't even think it's relevant. Both DeBry 
25 and—and—and Reeves—and—both DeBry and Steinfeld both 
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1 claim that they do not need to file a Rule 59, they said it 
2 wasn't a—a Rule 59. That the key is, if it's to occur, if 
3 you have a pleading that challenges the underlying facts and | 
4 conclusions of law within ten days, it's a Rule 59 motion | 
5 and it's a harsh motion on—on the plaintiffs in these— | 
6 these three cases. 
7 The court, looking back, the court, the appeals 
8 court, looking back, has to say on the record, looking at 
9 the record, that the judge dealt with the—with the—with 
10 the motion. Now, we do not—we do not doubt that the judge 
11 considered some—this; but I do not see how this Court can 
12 (inaudible) when he goes before the appeals court, the 
13 appeals court could look just based on the record, that you 
14 actually did deal with that motion. 
15 THE COURT: Believe me, I'm—I'm not going to make 
1 6 a decision on these issues exercising any mental gymnastics 
17 on what I expect the—the Court of Appeals to look back on, 
18 1 can assure you of that. I could care less, quite frankly, 
19 in that regard. 
20 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah, well, and—and real— 
21 THE COURT: And I don't mean that in any personal 
22 way, I just— 
23 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. 
24 THE COURT: -want you to know that that— 
25 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Yeah. 
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I 1 THE COURT: -that that's not persuasive for 
2 rulings, I'm not going to— 
3 MR. MOQUIN: Right. 
4 THE COURT: rm not going to engage in that type 
5 of thought process. 
6 MR. MOQUIN: Okay. But Reagan vs. Bloundt, the 
7 defendant— 
8 THE COURT: And let me just make it clear. I 
9 could care—if—if every one of my cases were appealed, that 
10 would be just fine with me. I mean, I— 
11 MR. MOQUIN: Well, my argument is for fairness, 
12 because I believe that if—if we would have filed this, the 
13 issue would have been raised on whether there was an 
14 outstanding Rule 59 and whether that made our—our—our 
15 appeal effective and I think a court looking back on the 
16 record would say, no, your appeal was not effective because 
17 there's nothing in—under the circumstances to suggest that 
18 it was considered, just looking at the record. 
19 THE COURT: What about the fact-what about the 
20 fact that it was briefed? 
21 MR. MOQUIN: Well, that's—that's a question too, 
22 because if it was a motion, a Rule 59 motion and— 
23 THE COURT: Well, when you say—clar—clarify your 
24 statement right now when you say "if it were a 59"--
25 MR. MOQUIN: Well, we believe—we believe it was. 
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1 THE COURT You're—you're talking about the 
2 reply, aren't you? \ 
3 MR MOQUIN The reply It was a 59 motion, then 
4 there shouldn't have been—if it was being treated like 
5 that, there should have been a response by—by opposing 
6 counsel and there would have been a reply by us and when you 
7 look at Reagan vs Bloundt, it actually looked to see 
8 whether there was a hearing on the motion There was no 
9 hearing on this motion 
10 And the other—other circumstances that they 
11 looked at surrounding— 
12 THE COURT It's not because you didn't even treat 
13 it as a 59(a) motion at that point in time 
14 MR MOQUIN Well, not— 
15 THE COURT You're just—you're arguing to me that 
16 it should be treated in that manner as a matter of law, not 
17 that you treated it that way 
118 MR MOQUIN Oh— 
19 THE COURT That's why there—that's why there was 
20 no hearing— 
21 MR MOQUIN Right 
22 THE COURT m that traditional sense— 
23 MR MOQUIN Well— 
24 THE COURT because you didn't treat it that 
25 way 
_____ 
1 MR MOQUIN No, we did not, but neither did— 
2 THE COURT It's not like I denied your request 
3 for a hearing in that regard and— 
4 MR MOQUIN No No, you did not, your Honor, but 
5 I think that if you look at DeBry and Reeves, they also did 
6 not think it was a Rule 59, they also did not treat it as a 
7 Rule 59, but the court said, as a matter of public policy, 
8 as a matter of law, we are going to treat it as a Rule 59 
9 If you file something ten days after questioning the 
10 findings of fact, conclusions of law, you're going to have 
Ml to live with the fact that this court is going to treat that 
12 as a Rule 59, regardless of your intent 
13 Your intent is—basically, your intent is 
14 irrelevant because we're going to treat this as a Rule 59 
15 And that (inaudible) says, we would have been held to that 
16 standard by the appeals court, I think that—that it is a 
17 Rule 59 at that point, regardless of what we thought at the 
18 time I don't think that's important because I don't think 
19 that the appeals court thinks that's important 
20 I think that this is- i t ' s -
21 THE COURT Well, we don't—well, I don't want to 
22 get into an argument— 
23 MR MOQUIN Okay 
24 THE COURT with you, as I don't know if we have 
25 the case in, or have had the case in front of our appellate 
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1 courts— 
2 MR MOQUIN Right 
3 THE COURT wherein a party has stepped forward 
4 and said to the trial court, your Honor, this is not a Rule 
5 59 motion 
6 MR MOQUIN Right But—but we did not— | 
7 THE COURT And then you come back— 
8 MR MOQUIN say that— 
9 THE COURT then you come back on the back side 
10 and say, oh, now, your Honor, it is a Rule 59 I'm not sure 
11 the appellate court has had that case 
12 MR MOQUIN Okay But—but once again, I will 
13 say that we never said it, that this was not a Rule 59 We 
14 said, in our reply that was filed, what was filed here was 
15 not a Rule 59 
16 THE COURT Well, are you sure your reply doesn't 
17 contain that language? 
18 MR MOQUIN It—it contains the language of 
19 saying that our proposed order, our January 28th objections 
20 were not a Rule 59 
21 THE COURT Okay Go ahead 
22 MR MOQUIN And I think that the—the other thing 
23 that's very important here just because of the time bne, 
24 if—I mean, you're saying, if I understand the Court 
25 correctly, that you addressed—you couldn't have addressed 
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1 our reply here— 
2 THE COURT That's correct 
I 3 MR MOQUIN and so if you addressed our reply, 
4 you had to address our reply here 
5 THE COURT Correct 
6 MR MOQUIN SO—SO we just want to make sure that 
7 we have a Rule 60(b) motion out here also and that Rule 
8 60(b) motion, if this is the correct time limit, when you 
9 address our objections, our Rule 59 objections, then we are-
10 -we have filed within the 90 days our Rule 60(b) motion and 
11 that has to be addressed by this court today 
12 THE COURT I understand your theory 
13 MR MOQUIN And I'd also like to object- address 
14 the 58(a) because we think it ties in to the 60(b), we think 
15 they're—they're related and they tie in, in that they say 
16 that 58(a) would not automatically give us a relief in that, 
17 that's true, but the failure to give the required notice is 
18 an important fact here in determining—determining the 
19 timeliness of post-judgment proceedings where an exact time 
20 limit is not prescribed 
21 And we say that on—on when you make the decision 
22 on 60(b), it's not a prescribed time period on when you 
23 figure it was excusable neglect We think it's very 
24 important whether we had notice in terms of the equities 
25 under Rule 60(b), because we—we failed to have notice 
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1 Opposing counsel, by—by saying—asking this Court 
2 to consider our motion at this stage, at this stage they— 
3 when they filed their response, they said you should treat 
4 this as a Rule 59 motion. That's going to create a 
5 situation where—where it doesn't surprise us that the Court 
6 is going to—to think about this and maybe take months to 
7 decide whether it is indeed a Rule 59 motion because there's 
8 not a lot of case law out there. 
9 So, that, in and of itself, led us to believe—and 
10 not to—not to expect a—a quick decision because they were 
11 making essentially the motion for you to treat our—our 
12 decision as a Rule 59 motion. I think the fact combined— 
13 combined with having no notice and the fact that Mr. 
14 Bennett's father was suffering from tongue cancer and he 
15 had—he had other things on his mind at the time, all put 
16 together, makes an equitable argument as to why a Rule 60(b) 
17 motion is appropriate in the case at bar. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR.MOQUiN: Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Just a moment. 
21 MR. BARBER: Read those two sentences. 
22 MR.MOQUIN: Stand corrected. Okay. 
23 Essentially, that's what I just said. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. But re—go ahead and re— 
25 MR. MOQUIN: Okay. Plaintiff's notice of 
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1 objections to a minute entry and proposed order is not a 
2 Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure motion. That's our 
3 original— 
4 MR. BARBER: That's the reply. 
5 MR. MOQUIN: -minute—minute entry. 
6 THE COURT: That's in the reply. 
7 MR. MOQUIN: This is in the reply (inaudible) 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean— 
9 MR.MOQUIN: Yeah. 
10 THE COURT: From a practical standpoint, I'm—I'm-
11 -it gives me heartburn that (inaudible) 
12 MR. MOQUIN: No, okay, but it's based on the fact 
13 that a Rule 59 motion requires a final decision and post-
14 judgment motion, which is our understanding at the point 
15 when we filed that. And that Swenson & Associates, 
16 Architects P.C. vs. State of Utah, no final order has been 
17 entered against the defendants, Michael Kirby or Post, Kirby 
18 and no post-judgment motion filed. You know, that was our 
19 understanding at the time and obviously, it wasn't— 
20 THE COURT: And—and that's what I said when I 
21 first put the question to Mr. Barber. I mean, if I—I 
22 indicated I wasn't sure how significant this issue is, but 
23 the practical reality is, is that you were— 
24 MR.MOQUIN: Right. 
25 THE COURT: -utilizing 4-504-2 to get every bite 
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1 of that apple that you could conceivably possibly get. I 
2 mean, that's the way this case—and I'm not being personally 
3 critical— | 
4 MR.MOQUIN: Right. Right. I 
5 THE COURT: - so please don't take it that way. 
6 MR. MOQUIN: Right. 
7 THE COURT: I'm just making what, to me, is an— 
8 appears to be an obvious observation. 
9 MR. MOQUIN: Right. 
10 THE COURT: And this is not the first time that 
11 the lawyers have been in front of me under the guise of 4-5-
12 -504-2-
13 MR. MOQUIN: Right. 
14 THE COURT: -filing an objection— 
15 MR.MOQUIN: Right. 
16 THE COURT: -and trying to get—argue issues 
17 beyond what I think that rule calls for and then also try 
18 and get the second bite of the apple by— 
19 MR. MOQUIN: Right. 
20 THE COURT: -either subsequently calling it a 
21 5 9 -
22 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah, and that's— 
23 THE COURT: -motion or—or otherwise; but— 
24 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Unfortunately, there's no case 
25 law prohibiting that. I mean, I think perhaps a remedy for 
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1 that is—is a motion to strike if you go beyond what the 4-
2 502—what the court thinks is an appropriate discussion 
3 under Rule 4-502, but there isn't any case law prohibiting 
4 an attorney from making that— 
I 5 THE COURT: How about—how about denying—how 
6 about denying your—your motion and—and signing the 
7 judgment and let you deal with the consequences of 
8 practicing in that manner? How does that— 
9 MR. MOQUIN: Well, it would be appropriate if we 
10 had some knowledge that you had indeed done that. I mean, I 
11 don't think we would have objected if you said—and we were 
12 waiting for that type of ruling and you—if you would have 
13 said and put out a—a motion and given us a minute entry 
14 that actually said we deny this because we believe it, you 
15 know, for—for the very reasons that you've just stated 
16 there and—and because you—we think you're—the Court 
17 believes that you're trying to take two bites of the apple, 
18 then I think we would have appealed from that and—and 
19 accepted—accepted that ruling for—for what it said. 
20 THE COURT: Are you through? 
21 Because—because you've raised issues outside of 
22 what Mr. Barber argued, I'm going to give Mr. Hoggard a 
23 brief opportunity to respond and then because you're the 
24 moving party, I'm going to give you a very, very brief 
25 opportunity to say something in rebuttal if you want to do 
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1 that. 
2 Go ahead. 
3 MR. HOGGARD: Just one issue, your Honor. 
4 MR. BARBER: What? 
5 MR. HOGGARD: On whether the reply hrief itself to 
6 be a new motion. Under 4-501, if you file a motion, you 
7 have to file an accompanying memorandum. Now, the reply 
8 memo, by itself, didn't have a motion and accompanying 
9 memorandum so it didn't even comply with the rules. 
10 Moreover, it's designated as a reply memorandum, 
11 raises the same issues which are dealt with in the moving 
12 objections and so it is a reply memorandum, not a separate 
13 order. And so I mean, this issue as—is this a separate 
14 motion as apart from the original notice? That—that didn't 
15 give us any notice, we would never have known to file 
16 additional responses, briefing to the reply memo. That 
17 would have been absurd. 
18 And that's really the only issue I wanted to 
19 address, is that the rules do not allow this reply to be 
20 considered as a Rule 59 motion, independent of the original 
21 notice of objections. 
22 THE COURT: Well, it's—well, nevermind. 
23 Don't we have case law—isn't counsel accurate, 
24 though, in identifying the fact that there is case law 
25 specifically referencing not paying attention to captions 
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1 and getting to the underlying merits of what the—the moving 
2 documents are—are—the relief that they are seeking, in 
3 fact? I mean, I understand your 4-501 argument, but— 
4 MR. HOGGARD: That is absolutely clear, your 
5 Honor, that you look at the substance, but the moving papers 
6 in this motion were the—was the notice itself. That's 
7 where the arguments were raised. This is a reply brief and 
8 so when you're looking at the substance, you look at—the 
9 issue if whether the motion is the first filing or the 
10 second filing. The motion is both of them, because you've 
11 got the motion, the memorandum which was the notice and then 
12 you have the reply memorandum. And so you can't play fine 
13 games by saying, well, the original papers were a motion but 
14 the reply brief was a motion. 
15 And they try to do that because you—you—the 
16 Court did in fact rule on the first moving papers and 
17 objections and so they want to say the reply was a second 
IIS motion or a second issue and it's not a second moving paper. 
19 THE COURT: Can you articulate in 60 seconds or 
20 less why under these circumstances, it's not fundamentally 
21 unfair that they be denied their right to an appeal? 
22 MR. HOGGARD: Yes. It was the last thing that I 
23 mentioned to the Court, which is, under these rules, the 
24 plaintiff has an independent duty to monitor the docket and 
25 has constructive notice. And so if there is a neglect here, 
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1 it was a neglect in checking on the docket. 
2 Now, Post, Kirby did in fact, although we did it 
3 late, we did in fact go check on the docket, independently, 
4 without notice from the Court, and we found the judgments, 
5 faxed and hand-delivered the notice of judgment when they 
6 still had a day to file a~a~an abbreviated Rule 60 relief. 
7 They didn't do so, they waited a month until they filed 
8 their relief later on. 
9 And so it was that defect which satisfies the due 
10 process considerations. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hoggard. 
12 Do you want to say anything, Mr. Barber, or other 
13 counsel, very briefly in rebuttal? 
14 MR. BARBER: Yeah. Your Honor, the argument that 
15 he makes about this—the integrated nature of the objections 
16 and so forth would all be well and good, I think, except for 
17 the language that counsel just read to you. 
18 When we say the only reason that this reply and 
19 that's what it's part of, is not a Rule 59 motion, is that 
20 there has been no judgment entered; but in fact, there had 
21 been a judgment entered and we didn't know it. So, implicit 
22 in that very language that counsel relies on is a far 
23 stronger argument to the contrary and that is, that since 
24 there was a judgment entered, this pleading ought to be 
25 deemed to be a Rule 59 motion. 
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1 I don't think we have anything further except 
2 this: I think the Court has jurisdiction under Subsection 
3 (6) of Rule 60(b) to grant relief here. 
4 THE COURT: That's the catchall phrase. 
5 MR. BARBER: That's the catchall phrase, and—and 
6 I'm not a big fan of that provision, particularly when I'm 
7 on the other side; but the circumstances in this case are 
8 truly unique. I've never seen anything in my 30 years and I 
9 doubt the Court has. They're just a combination of 
10 circumstances that create a fundamental unfairness. 
11 And the Court could do that in a lot of ways, you 
12 wouldn't even have to set aside the judgment, just rule that 
13 they are effective as of today, now we've got our ten days. 
14 And I~I think that's all it takes, I think something like 
15 that is what the Court ought to do. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Barber. 
17 What I want to do on this motion anyway, is to set 
18 a time this week that we can have a telephone conference 
19 call wherein I'll—I'll rule on this matter and I'd like to 
20 do that—I'd like to do that, if it's possible, this Friday 
21 morning, if all of you are going—are available for a 
22 telephone conference call and I could put the telephone 
23 conference call on the record. (Inaudible) 
24 And then there's another issue I want to talk to 
25 you about in just a moment. 
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1 (Inaudible discussion between the Court and 
2 clerk.) 
3 THE COURT: 8:15. I 
4 MR. BARBER: 8:15? | 
5 THE COURT: And I'm going to rely on—on one of 
6 you to initiate the telephone conference call and my 
7 preference in doing that—there are times when I have my 
8 clerk do it, but my preference is that I'm concerned that we 
9 may have counsel from out of state and I don't want the—the 
10 State of Utah to have the long distance. I know that sounds 
11 weird, but I get a—I get a monthly telephone bill, I don't 
12 have to pay, from the State, but it puts me on notice, the 
13 long distance usage of my telephone line and so I'm trying 
14 to reduce that monthly obligation, so I'm going to rely on— 
15 who's going to take that responsibility? 
16 MR. BARBER: I could do it, your Honor; but can 
17 you give me the number that we should dial to get you? 
18 THE COURT: That should be (801) 238-7503; is that 
119 right? 
20 MR. BARBER: 238-7503? 
21 THE COURT: U h huh. 
22 MR. BARBER: Okay. I'll do it. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 Now, there's one other issue I want to take care 
25 of and keep in mind, I have not reviewed the full file, even 
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1 though I have taken a look at the docket text, but I have in 
2 front of me a notice to submit and request for a ruling and 
3 an order of dismissal. The notice to submit is dated 
4 September 7th. 
5 Are all of you familiar with these—these 
6 documents? If not, step forward and take a look at them. I 
7 believe that Mr. Stephens— 
8 MR. BARBER: Is that yours, Brent? 
9 MR. STEPHENS: Yes . 
10 THE COURT: - i s probably very familiar with them. 
11 MR. STEPHENS: lam. 
12 THE COURT: Just—just take a look at them and 
13 tell me if you are familiar with them? 
14 MR. BARBER. Yeah, I've— 
15 (Inaudible) 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Now, did—did you want to see 
17 them? 
18 MR.MOQUIN: No. I did. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. STEPHENS: He's seen them, that's fine. 
21 THE COURT: And just—just so that we're clear on 
22 this point and I'm not trying to be cute here at all; there-
23 -there is no signed order in this file as of yet regarding 
24 the issues that are the subject of this proposed order. Is 
25 that correct? 
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1 MR. STEPHENS: That is correct. I checked the 
2 docket, the last time we checked the docket, there is no 
3 order entered on those submissions. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Now, here's my question. In 
5 the—there is a reference to a—a—what I construe to be a 
6 letter objection; does that sound familiar? 
7 MR. STEPHENS: Yes, your Honor, Mr. Barber sent me 
8 an objection by letter to my order that I submitted to him 
9 pursuant to the rules before I submitted this to the Court. 
10 1 submitted my response to the objection, attached his 
11 letter objection, I thought, and then submitted a notice to 
12 submit— 
13 THE COURT: And that's to—and—and the point I 
14 want to clarify before I render a decision on this matter, 
15 is that that letter objection is the only objection on file; 
16 is that correct? 
17 MR. BARBER: To my knowledge. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Then I need—a copy of that was 
19 not attached to your proposed submission and I don't believe 
20 there's one—I looked through the docket text and could not 
21 find one on the file. 
22 MR. BARBER: It's—it is not copied to the Court. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. So, in—in order to resolve 
24 that issue, I need to see— 
25 MR. BARBER: No, we're not going-
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1 THE COURT: If you want to with—if you want to 
2 withdraw your objection, I111 sign—I'll sign the order 
3 a n d -
4 MR. BARBER: May I come forward? 
5 THE COURT: You may. 
6 So, this is something I can—can—can file; is 
7 that correct? 
8 MR. STEPHENS: Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Al l right. Then I'll take a 
10 look at this and resolve it on Friday also. 
11 MR. BARBER: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: We're in recess. 
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, 
Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID D. BENNETT 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH etai., 
Defendants. 
RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT 
ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN 
& SWEAT, LLP, MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
INDIVIDUALLY 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Civil No. 940908220 
The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & 
Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, came on for oral argument 
before the Court on October 25, 1999. James S. Jardine and Rick B. Hoggard of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker appeared on behalf of these defendants, R. Priya Seshachari of Taft Securities Litigation, P.C, 
and James N. Barber appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Having considered the argument of counsel 
and the memoranda and supporting material submitted by each party, the Court notified the parties by 
1 
Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the 
analytical points and authorities set forth in defendants' memoranda. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, 
1. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, 
Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, is granted on all 
claims asserted against them. 
2. All claims asserted against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. 
Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, individually, in the Fourth Amended Complaint are dismissed 
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over those parties. 
3. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of judgment on the claims 
against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby, 
individually, because the jurisdictional basis for dismissal of the claims against these defendants is 
wholly separate from the substantive claims asserted against the other defendants, and from the issues 
raised by the other defendants' pending motions to dismiss those claims. 
4. The Court directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. > ^ 
DATED this <*^ day of ir, 4*^ . 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
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Minute Entry dated January 7, 2000, that it had granted the motion to dismiss based upon all of the 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, 
1. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction of Defendants Post, Kirby, 
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claims asserted against them. 
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Utah Supreme Court No. 20000518-SC 
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff-appellant David D. 
Bennett, submits this Docketing Statement in support of his Notice of Appeal of a supposed final 
decision in the underlying case David D. Bennett v. the Law Firm of Jones Waldo Holbrook & 
McDonough: Christopher L. Burton; Sidney G. Baucom; James S. Lowry; and the Law Firm of 
Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat, LLC; and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and Individually, Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 94-0908220. See, 
Attachment "A". Rule 9 requests the following information in the order presented: 
1. Date of Entry of Judgment Appealed From: 
The entry date of judgment sought to be reviewed is February 28, 2000.' See. 
Attachment "D". A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000. thirty days after plaintiff-
appellant received notice of that judgment from the prevailing party, the Law Firm of Post Kirby 
Noonan & Sweat, LLC and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and individually (collectively "Post 
Kirby"). Rule 58(A)(d), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. See, Attachments "B" and UC'\ 
The lower court's February 28, 2000 judgment was not received by plaintiff-appellant 
until May 10, 2000.2 Id. Through an apparent ministerial error of the clerk of court, notice of 
that decision was never mailed out to the parties by the lower court. In addition, the prevailing 
party, defendant-appellee Post Kirby, in violation of Rule 58(A)(d) of the Utah Rules Civil 
Procedure, failed to notice plaintiff of the February 28th ruling until May 10th, some 3 months 
later also due to lack of any notice given to the prevailing party. The prevailing party, however, 
1
 That February 28, 2000 ruling is identical to a February 11, 2000 decision. See, Attachment 
"F". 
2
 The February 11, 2000 decision was also not received by plaintiff until May 10, 2000. See, 
Attachments "B" and "C". 
2 
also did not receive notice of the February 28th (or identical February 11th, 2000) ruling until on 
or around May 10th, 2000. See, Attachment UC". 
2. Nature of Post Judgment Motions and Date Filed: 
On February 16, 2000, plaintiff-appellant David D. Bennett filed a Reply of Plaintiff in 
Support of his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Reply") which challenged the substance and conclusions of the lower court's February 
11, 2000 judgment (See, Attachment "E") - - even though that ruling was not known about or 
received until May 10, 2000; by operation of law, that reply should be deemed a "Rule 59 
motion \ U.R.Civ.P.3 See, DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah App. 
1992) (holding that a motion filed within ten days of the entry of a judgment that questions the 
courts findings and conclusions is a post-judgment motion under Rule 52(b) or 59(e)). 
Confusingly, the February 11, 2000 judgment was later re-entered on February 28, 2000; but by 
its terms, the February 28, 2000 ruling appears to not take into account plaintiff-appellant's 
February 16, 2000 "Rule 59" challenges to the February 11th ruling.4 See, Attachments "D" and 
"F". 
3. Date and Effect of Order Disposing of Post Judgment Motion and Order of Determination of 
Final Judgment Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54fbV. 
Frankly, it is not clear whether the "Rule 59" motion filed in the form of a Reply on 
February 16, 2000 was ever disposed of by the underlying court. If it were, that final judgment 
might be the order dated February 28, 2000; if the reply were not yet decided upon, there would 
3 
Plaintiff-appellant has recently moved the lower court to consider those objections a Rule 59 
motion and to make a decision on that motion; the motion also sought that court to strike the 
February 28th ruling. 
Plaintiff-appellant maintains that that "Rule 59" motion filed by him on February 16, 2000 in 
the form of the Reply has yet to be decided upon by the lower court. See, footnote 3. 
3 
yet to be any final judgment on that motion. Plaintiff-appellant believes that no decision has yet 
been made on that Rule 59 motion, yet files this appeal under the alternative possibility. 
4. Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal: 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000, thirty (30) days after plaintiff-appellant 
received a May 10. 2000 notice of that judgment from the prevailing party, the Law Firm of Post 
Kirby Noonan & Sweat, LLC and Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and individually (collectively uPost 
Kirby"). Rule 58(A)(d), Utah Rules Civil Procedure. See, Attachment "A". 
5. Jurisdiction: 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure as an appeal as of right. 
6. Name of Trial Court or Agency: 
This appeal is from a final judgment entered by the Third District Court, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, filed on February 28, 2000. 
7. Statement of Facts: 
Plaintiff-appellant herein, David D. Bennett, was the lead named plaintiff in a corporate 
derivative and securities class action lawsuit filed solely by him in Utah federal court against 
Gen-Probe, Inc., a California corporation, its directors as well as Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the 
company that acquired Gen-Probe, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Gen-Probe case"). See. 
David D. Bennett, et aL v. Gen-Probe. Inc.. et al.. United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, Central Division, 2:89-C-1074 G. In the legal representation of plaintiff-client David 
Bennett, and others over time, a joint venture partnership was created between Utah counsel 
involving the law firm Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough, and California counsel and 
defendant-appellants herein, Post Kirby. Throughout the representation of client David Bennett, 
4 
After Post Kirby were no longer David Bennett's lawyers, a malicious campaign was 
waged against Mr. Bennett through attempts designed to prevent Mr. Bennett from filing a 
lawsuit against them for breaches of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice, etc. in the State of 
Utah though a wrongful injunction (labeled a "bar order") served upon David Bennett at his 
home in this state. That injunction was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. Severe mental and emotional distress was suffered by David Bennett requiring medical 
care and medication in the State of Utah. 
8. Issue for Review and Standard of Review: 
The issues presented are: 1) whether the defendant-appellant Post Kirby made 
minimum contacts in the State of Utah to satisfy the lower court's imposition of jurisdiction 
under the Utah Long Arm Statute of the Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-24; and 2) if 
jurisdiction is found by this Court, whether the claims pleaded against Post Kirby and Mr. Kirby 
by plaintiff-appellee David Bennett can be maintained in the courts of the State of Utah on due 
process grounds. "Due Process requires us to consider: '(I) whether the cause of action arises 
out of or has a substantial connection with the activity; (2) the balancing of the convenience of 
the parties and the interests of the State in assuming jurisdiction; and (3) the character of the 
defendant's activity within the State." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 393 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23, 25, (April 20, 2000), citing Brown v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 
1980). 
The standard of review on "an issue of jurisdiction is one of law as applied to the facts as 
properly determined", therefor, the court is free to "grant no deference to the conclusions of the 
trial court". SH MegDiamond Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430 (Utah 
1998). See, Kadmar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991) ("If there are no 
6 
material disputes in the documentary evidence, the appellate court reviews the matter de novo to 
determine whether as a matter of law jurisdiction exists.") 
9. Determination of Case by Supreme Court: 
Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute, plaintiff-appellant David Bennett seeks a de novo 
review as of right of the e\ idence presented to the lower court used to show that defendant-
appellee Post Kirby made sufficient prima facie minimum contacts in the State of Utah to allow 
Mr. Bennett to maintain his lawsuit in the lower court as against that party through to a trial on 
the merits. 
10. Determinative Law: 
a). Utah Long Arm Statute of the Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-24. 
b). Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, Section 1, and the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
c). Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, (April 20, 
2000). 
d). Starwavs v. Curry, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (May 18, 1999). 
e). SH MegDiamond Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp.. 969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998). 
f). Neways. Inc. v. McCausland. 950 P.2d 420. 422 (Utah 1997) (stating that "'plaintiff is 
only required to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction'" and that '"any disputes in 
the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs favor"') (quoting Anderson v. American 
Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990)). 
g). Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 P.2d 1073,1077 (Utah App. 1996) (The time for filing a 
notice of appeal is tolled until the trial court denied the "Rule 59 motion" which asks the court to 
alter its findings and to amend its conclusions.). 
h). PeBrv v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-523 (Utah App. 1992) 
("Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that 
questions the correctness of the court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-
judgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e). The substance of a motion, and not its 
caption, is controlling."). 
i). Kadmar & Co. v. Larav Co.. Inc.. 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). 
j). Anderson v. American Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825. 827 (Utah 1990V 
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k). Brown v. Carries Corp., 611 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1980). 
1). Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1215-
1216 ("[A] judgment cannot stand unless there are findings which will justify it"). 
m). Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2587 (1977) (Due process is 
satisfied if defendant had "fair warning the [his activities] may subject [him] to the jurisdiction of 
the foreign sovereign.*') 
11. Related Appeals: 
There are no related appeals at this time. 
12. Attachments: 
A. Notice of Appeal, filed June 9, 2000. 
B. Notice of Entry of Judgment, filed May 10, 2000. 
C. Affidavit of Rick B. Hoggard in Support of Post Kirby's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60 Motion, filed June 6, 2000. 
D. Order, entered February 28, 2000. (This order is identical to Order entered 
February 11. 2000) 
E. Reply of Plaintiff in Support of his Notice of Objections to A Minute Entry and 
Proposed Order, filed February 16, 2000. [This "Reply" should be deemed a 
"Rule 59" motion which has not clearly been ruled upon]. 
F. Order, entered February 11, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 2000 
J^mes N. Barber 
lite 100, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
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Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Docket No. 20000518-SC 
Subject to Assignment to the Court of 
Appeals 
Pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees Post 
Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby APC (collectively 
"Post Kirby") move for summary dismissal on the basis that this Court lacks jurisdiction on this 
appeal. 
On June 9, 2000, Appellant David D. Bennett ("Bennett") filed a notice of appeal from a 
judgment entered either February 11, 2000, or February 28, 2000. Prior to that notice, Bennett 
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had filed what he contends was a Rule 59 motion. That motion is either still pending before the 
district court, or was disposed of by the district court upon entry of the February 28, 2000 
judgment. 
If Bennett's motion was in fact a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, on which the district court 
has yet to rule, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be premature and of no effect. Utah 
R.App.P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall 
have no effect"). 
If Bennett's motion was not a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, or has already been disposed 
of by the district court, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be untimely because it was filed 
more than thirty days after the entry of the appealed judgment or the disposition of that motion. 
Utah R.App.P. 4(a). 
Under either theory, Bennett's notice of appeal is of no effect. Consequently, his appeal 
must be dismissed. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine LJ 
Rick B Hoggard 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Certificate of Service 
I, Rick B Hoggard, certify that on the 18th day of July, 2000,1 served a copy of the 
foregoing motion upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing it to them by 
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
James N. Barber 
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Priya Seshachari 
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C. 
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15 
San Francisco, California 94108 
543928 
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Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Docket No. 20000518-SC 
Subject to Assignment to the Court of 
Appeals 
Pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees 
Post Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby A.P.C. 
(collectively "Post Kirby") respectfully submit this memorandum in support of their 
motion for summary dismissal of this appeal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 9, 2000, Appellant David D. Bennett ("Bennett") filed a notice of 
appeal from a judgment entered either February 11, 2000, or February 28, 2000 (the 
"February 11th judgment" and "February 28th judgment" respectively). Prior to that 
notice, Bennett had filed what he contends was a Rule 59 motion, but that motion either 
is still pending before the district court or was disposed of by the Court by necessary 
implication upon the entry of the February 28th judgment. 
If Bennett's motion was in fact a Rule 59 (or similar) motion, on which the 
district court has not yet ruled, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be premature and 
of no effect. Utah R.App.P. 4(b) ("A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect"). If Bennett's motion was not a Rule 59 
(or similar) motion, or if the district court rejected that motion by entry of its February 
28th judgment, then Bennett's notice of appeal would be untimely because it was filed 
more than thirty days after the entry of the appealed judgment. Utah R.App.P. 4(a). 
Under either theory, Bennett's notice of appeal is of no effect. Consequently, Bennett's 
appeal must be dismissed. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
1. On January 7, 2000, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley issued a minute 
entry granting Post Kirby's motion to dismiss Bennett's complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. (See Exhibit A.) 
2. Pursuant to the direction of the district court and Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, Post Kirby prepared and served on Bennett a proposed 
Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, 
LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually.1 
3. On January 28, 2000, Bennett filed his Notice of Plaintiffs Objections to 
a Minute Entry and Proposed Order. (See Exhibit B.) 
4. On February 7, 2000, Post Kirby filed their Response to Bennett's Notice 
of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order, together with a courtesy copy of 
the proposed judgment. (See Exhibit C.) 
5. On February 11, 2000, the district court signed and entered the proposed 
judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (See Exhibit D.) 
1
 The proposed judgment included a Rule 54(b) certification because Bennett had also 
asserted various claims against a Utah law firm, Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough ("Jones Waldo"). The district court dismissed Bennett's claims against 
Jones Waldo on non-jurisdictional grounds by Minute Entry dated February 11, 2000. 
That ruling has yet to be memorialized by any judgment. 
2 
6. On February 16, 2000, Bennett filed a "Reply of Plaintiff in Support of 
his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and Proposed Order. (See Exhibit E.) In 
that reply, Bennett expressly argued that his "Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry 
and Proposed Order is not a Rule 59, U.R.Civ.P. motion." (IcL at 4.) 
7. On February 17, 2000, Post Kirby filed a Notice to Submit for Signature 
the Proposed Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants Post, Kirby, 
Noonan & Sweat, LLP, Michael L. Kirby A.P.C., and Michael L. Kirby Individually, 
which expressly referenced Bennett's objections and provided another courtesy copy of 
the proposed judgment. (See Exhibit F.) 
8. On February 28, 2000, the district court again signed and entered the 
proposed judgment, but no notice of entry was provided to either party. (See Exhibit 
G.) 
9. On May 9, 2000, counsel for Post Kirby inquired of Judge Medley's clerk 
as to the status of the case, and was informed that judgments had been entered on 
February 11th and 28th. Copies of those judgments were obtained by Post Kirby, and a 
Notice of Entry of Judgment was filed by Post Kirby on May 10, 2000. (See Exhibit 
H.) The notice and copies of the judgments were hand-delivered and faxed to Bennett's 
counsel in Utah and California, respectively, at around noon on May 10th. 
3 
10. On May 26,2000, Bennett filed a Motion to the Court under Rule 60 to 
Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon a Timely Filed Rule 59 
Motion. (See Exhibit I.) Bennett argued that the February 11th judgment was the 
operative judgment, but that his objection to the proposed judgment (in particular his 
reply brief) was a Rule 59 motion upon which the Court had yet to rule. 
11. On June 6, 2000, Post Kirby opposed Bennett's motion and filed an 
affidavit explaining the circumstances surrounding their filing of the notice of entry of 
judgment. (See Exhibit J.) Post Kirby argued that Bennett's objection was not a 
motion for new trial under Rule 59 and, in any event, the district court's reentry of the 
judgment after the completion of briefing disposed of those objections by necessary 
implication. 
12. On June 9, 2000, Bennett filed a Notice of Appeal of Final Order. 
Bennett's notice stated that he was appealing from the February 28th judgment, and that 
the appeal was timely because the "appeal falls within 30 days of the notice date." 
13. On June 23, 2000, Bennett filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
to the Court under Rule 60 to Strike a February [28], 2000 Ruling; and to Decide upon 
a Timely Filed Rule 59 Motion. (See Exhibit K.) On that same date, Bennett filed a 
Notice to Submit for Decision. (See Exhibit L.) 
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14. The district court has not yet ruled on Bennett's May 26th motion. (See 
Exhibit M.) 
15. On July 6, 2000, Bennett filed a Docketing Statement in this appeal. In 
particular, Bennett stated: 
The entry date of judgment sought to be reviewed is February 28, 2000. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 9, 2000, thirty days after plaintiff-
appellant received notice of that judgment from the prevailing party . . . . Rule 
58(A)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Docketing Statement at 2 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).) In addition, Bennett 
stated: 
Frankly, it is not clear whether the "Rule 59" motion filed in the form of 
a Reply on February 16, 2000 was ever disposed of by the underlying court. If 
it were, that final judgment might be the order dated February 28, 2000; if the 
reply were not yet decided upon, there would yet to be any final judgment on 
that motion. Plaintiff-appellant believes that no decision has yet been made on 
that Rule 59 motion, yet files this appeal under the alternative possibility. 
(IdL at 3-4.) 
ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Bennett's notice of 
appeal must be "filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from."" Utah R.App.P. 4(a). If, however, Bennett had timely filed a 
motion under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then "the 
5 
time for appeal" would "run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion." Utah R.App.P. 4(b). 
Inasmuch as Bennett's notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the 
entry of judgment, the timeliness of Bennett's notice of appeal depends on the status of 
any motions under Rule 50, 52 or 59. As articulated by the parties in connection with 
Bennett's pending May 26th motion, this case is in one of two postures: either 
(1) There is no currently unresolved, timely-filed Rule 59 motion, 
either because Bennett's objection to the proposed form of judgment was not a 
motion under Rule 59, or if the objection was a Rule 59 motion, then such 
motion was necessarily disposed of by the district court no later than upon its 
entry of the February 28th judgment, or 
(2) There is a currently pending, but undecided, timely Rule 59 motion 
because Bennett's objection to the proposed form of judgment was in fact a 
motion under Rule 59, but the district court has not yet disposed of that motion. 
Under either scenario, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely. 
A. If There is No Unresolved Rule 59 Motion, Then Bennett's Notice of 
Appeal Is Late. 
Under the first scenario, either no timely under Rule 59 had been filed, or any 
such motion was disposed of no later than by the district court's entry of the February 
6 
28th judgment. In either case, Bennett's notice of appeal would have had to have been 
filed no more than 30 days after the entry of judgment (whether the February 11th or 
February 28th judgment) and/or the district court's denial of his "Rule 59" motion (i.e., 
the February 28th judgment). Consequently, his appeal would have been untimely no 
later than thirty days after February 28th. Utah R.App.P. 4. 
Bennett suggests that the 30-day appeal period starts from the date of "notice" of 
entry of judgment. (Notice of Appeal at 1-2; Docketing Statement at 2-3.) That 
suggestion, however, is frivolous because Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure expressly states that the "time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by 
the requirement of this provision." Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(d); see also Lincoln Ben. Life 
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Prop., 838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Under 
Utah law, Bennett cannot excuse his failure to timely file a notice of appeal due to Post 
Kirby's allegedly failure to comply with Rule 58A2 because he had an independent 
obligation to monitor the docket to determine the date of entry of the judgment. See 
West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997); Reeves v. Stinfeldt, 915 P.2d 
1073, 1077 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2
 Non-compliance with Rule 58A may be a factor relevant to a request for relief from a 
judgment under Rule 60(b). See Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 
751 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, any Rule 60 request for relief should be first 
directed to the district court. 
7 
B. If There is a Pending Rule 59 Motion, Then Bennett's Appeal is 
Premature. 
Under the second scenario, Bennett's "Rule 59" motion has yet to be decided. If 
that were the case (which Post Kirby denies), then Bennett's notice of appeal would 
clearly be premature. Under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a 
"notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions [including a 
Rule 59 motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment] shall have no effect. 
A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the 
future entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above." 
Utah R.App.P. 4(b). 
Thus, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely because there has been no 
ruling within thirty days of that notice which could have given rise to an appeal. 
Although Post Kirby contends that Bennett has already lost his right to appeal, the only 
arguably remaining basis for appeal would have to arise out of or be related to the 
district court's future disposition of the pending May 26th motion.3 
3
 Ironically, Bennett's filing of his notice of appeal may inhibit the district court from 
ruling on the May 26th motion. See, e j^ , 20 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice, § 303.32[1] - [2] at 303-71 to -74 (3d ed. 2000) (notice of appeal divests 
district court of jurisdiction to reexamine or supplement order or judgment from which 
the appeal is pending.) 
8 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the district court's resolution of Bennett's pending May 26th 
motion, Bennett's current notice of appeal is untimely. Whether his notice was 
premature or tardy (which depends on the district court's raling), it is clear that the 
notice is not timely. Thus, Bennett's appeal must be dismissed. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
Rick B Hoggard 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
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by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
James N. Barber 
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Priya Seshachari 
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C. 
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15 
San Francisco, California 94108 
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James N. Barber, Esq. (USBN #0198) 
Fourth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
Telecopier: (801) 364-3406 
R. Priya Seshachari, Esq. (USBN #6329) 
TAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, P.C. 
1200 Clay Street, Suite 15 
San Francisco, California 94108 
Telephone: (415)776-4900 
Telecopier: (415) 922-1832 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
DAVID D. BENNETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY, 
NOONAN & SWEET, L.L.C.; and 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, A.P.C. and 
Individually. 
Defendants. 
* MOTION TO REMAND AND 
* VACATE BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
[Hearing Requested] 
* Utah Supreme Court No. 20000518-SC 
* 
COMES NOW plaintiff-appellant David D. Bennett, through counsel James N. 
Barber and R. Priya Seshachari, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure moves this High Court to remand the jurisdiction of this case back to the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah for the purpose of allowing that lower 
court the jurisdiction to decide an outstanding motion relevant to this appeal. That finding is 
necessary to clarify some issues now confusing this appeal. Pending that decision by the 
trial court, plaintiff-appellant moves for vacation of the current briefing schedule. 
DATED this ^S^iscy of July 2000. 
J^ 
/James N. 'Barber 
Attorney for Plaintiff David D. Bennett 
Plaintiff David D. Bennett 
1189 South 2100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of July, 2000, 
I caused to be sent, through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing: 
MOTION TO REMAND AND 
VACATE BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
addressed to the following: 
James Jardine, Esq. 
Rick Hoggard, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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James N. Barber, Esq. (USBN #0198) 
Fourth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
Telecopier: (801) 364-3406 
R. Priya Seshachari, Esq. (USBN #6329) 
TAFT SECURITIES LITIGATION, P.C. 
1200 Clay Street, Suite 15 
San Francisco, California 94108 
Telephone: (415) 776-4900 
Telecopier: (415)922-1832 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
DAVID D. BENNETT, 
* MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff, * IN SUPPORT OF 
* MOTION TO REMAND AND 
vs. * VACATE BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
* 
THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY, * [Hearing Requested] 
NOONAN & SWEET, L.L.C.; and * 




Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff-appellant 
David D. Bennett, through counsel James N. Barber and R. Priya Seshachari, files this 
memorandum in support of an accompanying Motion to Remand and Vacate Briefing 
Schedule. 
L RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an order remanding this case back to the Third District Court 
HAY QUI 
JUL 2 ? 2000 
& NEBEft; 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah because the District Court has not yet ruled upon 
plaintiff-appellant's "Reply of Plaintiff In Support of His Notice of Objections to a Minute 
Entry and Proposed Order" which was filed on February 16, 2000 (within five days of the 
entry of the February 11, 2000 judgment) and which must, on the basis of DeBrv v. Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company, 828 P.2d 250, 523 (Utah App. 1992) must be treated as a 
motion for new trial under Rule 59(a), or a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 
59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, either of which would have the effect of staying the 
effective date of the identical judgments entered by the Court on February 11 and February 
28, 2000 so as to preserve plaintiff-appellant's right to appeal those judgments. 
As a result of the District Court's failure to rule on this pending motion, the record on 
appeal incomplete. The Court should therefore vacate the current briefing schedule until the 
District Court has ruled on this critical motion. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 7, 2000 the District Court filed a minute entry indicating its intention 
to entry a judgment of dismissal of all claims against the Post Kirby defendants for lack of 
jurisdiction. Notice of this minute entry was transmitted by the Court to all parties to the 
action. 
2. On January 28, 2000 plaintiff-appellant filed a "Notice of Plaintiffs Objections to 
Minute Entry and Proposed Order" in which he set forth his arguments that the minute entry 
was contrary to both the facts and the applicable law. The District Court has never filed an 
order or minute entry disposing of this notice of objection. 
3. On February 8, 2000, the Post Kirby defendants filed their response to plaintiffs 
January 28, 2000 Notice of Objection. The District Court has never ruled on this Response. 
4. Rather than ruling on the pending pleadings, the District Court entered Judgment 
dismissing the Post Kirby defendants from the action for lack of jurisdiction on February 11, 
2000. No notice of the entry of this Judgment was provided to any of the parties to the 
action. 
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4. Because plaintiff-appellant was not advised that judgment had been entered, he 
filed a "Reply of Plaintiff In Support of his Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and 
Proposed Order" on February 16, 2000. The District Court has never directly ruled on this 
Reply. 
5. For some reason which does not appear of record, the Court then entered a second 
judgment on February 28, 2000 which is identical to the judgment entered on February 11, 
2000, dismissing the Post Kirby defendants from the action. The Court failed to provide any 
notice of entry of this second judgment to any of the parties to the action and, once again, 
entered the same without ruling on the pending notice of objection to the January 7, 2000 
minute entry. 
6. On May 26, 2000 plaintiff filed a "Motion to Strike a February 28, 2000 Ruling 
and to Decide a Timely Rule 59 Motion" with a supporting memorandum of authorities. 
Responsive pleadings were filed by the Post Kirby defendants on June 7, 2000, and plaintiff-
appellant filed a Reply in support of his May 26 motion on June 23, 2000. The District 
Court has yet to rule on any of these pleadings. 
7. On June 23, 2000, plaintiff-appellant filed a Notice to Submit his May 26,2000 
"Motion to the Court Under Rule 60 to Strike A February 28th, 2000 Ruling and to Decide a 
Timely Rule 59 Motion" and requested a hearing thereon. 
III. ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: Plaintiff-Appellant Moves this Court to Remand this Appeal Back to the 
Lower Court to Allow a Decision by that Court on a Pending Motion Relevant to the 
Jurisdiction and Substance of this Appeal; Pending that Ruling, this Court's Briefing 
Schedule Should be Vacated 
Plaintiff-appellant moves this Highest Court to remand the above-captioned case back 
to the lower Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; a motion by plaintiff-
appellant remains as yet undecided before that trial court with jurisdictional and substantive 
- 3 -
issues relevant to this appeal. 
Divestiture of this Court's appellate jurisdiction is required. In White v. State of 
Utah, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990), this Court stated: 
The general rule has therefore been that an appeal divests the trial court of 
jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, where it remains 
until the appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court regains 
jurisdiction. 
As such, the trial court cannot finally decide the motion before it until remand is effective and 
the jurisdiction of the case is back with the lower court. 
In the motion filed with the lower court, plaintiff-appellant prays for that court to sort 
out the confusion that still plagues the underlying case and thereby this appeal. The 
confusion includes a failure of due process notice of a "final" order to the plaintiff-appellant 
for almost three months; the status of a filing sought to be deemed a Rule 59 motion under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; a decision upon that Rule 59 motion; and the status of 
two identical judgments. See, Statement of Facts, above. 
Until that confusion is sorted out, plaintiff-appellant moves this Court to vacate the 
current briefing schedule. Judicial resources would be conserved by permitting the lower 
court to decide the issues. 
- 4 -
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-appellant moves this High Court to remand this case back to the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County to allow that court to rule on an outstanding motion. 
Relevant issues concerning the jurisdiction of this Court as well as the substantive issues on 
appeal are yet to be decided. Pending that decision by the lower court, plaintiff-appellant 
asks this Court to remand and vacate the current briefing schedule. 
DATED this 25th day of July 2000. 
Janies N. Barber 
Attorney for Plaintiff David D. Bennett 
Plaintiff David D. Bennett 
1189 South 2100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ S ^ day of July, 2000, 
I caused to be sent, through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing: 
MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO REMAND AND 
VACATE BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
addressed to the following: 
James Jardine, Esq. 
Rick Hoggard, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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James S. Jardine (A 1647) 
Rick B Hoggard (A5088) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Fl L E D 
AUG 0 <t 2009 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DAVID D. BENNETT 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
THE LAW FIRM OF POST, KIRBY, 
NOONAN AND SWEAT, LLC; AND 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY, APC and 
INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPELLEES' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND/OR 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO REMAND AND VACATE BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
Docket No. 20000518-SC 
Subject to Assignment to the Court of 
Appeals 
Appellees Post Kirby, Noonan and Sweat, LLC, Michael L. Kirby, and Michael L. Kirby 
APC (collectively "Post ICirby") respectfully file this reply memorandum in support of their 
motion for summary disposition and/or response to Appellant's motion to remand and vacate 
briefing schedule. 
On July 18,2000, Post Kirby filed a motion for summary disposition in this appeal. Post 
Kirby argued that if Appellant had filed a Rule 59 (or similar) motion in January/February 2000, 
on which the district court has yet to rule, then Appellant's notice of appeal would be premature 
and of no effect. Alternatively, if the district court had ruled on that motion (by necessary 
implication in February 2000), or if no such motion had been timely filed, then Appellant's 
notice of appeal would be too late.1 Thus, regardless of any confusion at the district court level, 
this current appeal is untimely and improper. 
Rather than directly responding to Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition, 
Appellant filed a motion to remand and vacate briefing schedule on July 25, 2000.2 Appellant 
argues that this Court must "remand" this case so that the district court may "sort out the 
confusion that still plagues the underlying case." Appellant recognizes that the district court is 
divested of jurisdiction "until the [pending] appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court 
regains jurisdiction." (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand and Vacate Briefing Schedule at 2 
(quoting White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990).) It is not clear from Appellant's 
motion whether Appellant agrees that dismissal of the current appeal is the proper method of 
terminating this appellate proceeding. 
For the reasons set forth in Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition, and the 
authorities set forth by Appellant in its motion to remand, this Court must dismiss or terminate 
1
 As noted previously, Appellant also filed a motion in May 2000, which motion is still pending before the district 
court. That motion has no effect on the issues presently before this Court. The May motion was not "a timely 
motion" under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59, which would independently toll the time for appeal. Utah R.App.P. 4(b). 
Consequently, the timeliness of the current appeal depends solely upon the characterization and resolution of the 
January/February motion. Any appeal arising out of the resolution of the May motion must await the district court's 
future disposition of that motion. 
2
 No other timely response to Post Kirby's motion for summary disposition was filed by Appellant. 
the pending appeal as untimely, so as to remand the case to the district court for resolution of any 
pending motions. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine U 
Rick B Hoggard 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
Certificate of Service 
I, Rick B Hoggard, certify that on the 4th day of August, 2000,1 served a copy of the. 
foregoing motion upon the following counsel for appellant in this matter by mailing it to them by 
first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: 
James N. Barber 
Bank One Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Priya Seshachari 
Taft Securities Litigation, P.C. 
1200 Clay Street, Suite N15 
San Francisco, California 94108 
Tab 10 
Page 1 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
DAVID BENNETT, 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 940908220 
MOTION 
(Videotape Proceedings) JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK fc 
MCDONOUGH, et ai., 
Defendants. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of 
February 2001, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE TYRONE E- MEDLEY, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: JAMES N. BARBER 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Broadway, #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
Attorney at Law 
443 East 2400 South 
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is 
4 Case No. 940908220. 
5 Let's start by having counsel identify themselves 
6 for the record. 
7 MR. MOQUIN: Daniel Moquin representing the 
8 plaintiff, David Bennett. 
9 MR. BARBER: James Barber for the plaintiff. 
10 MR. HOGGARD: Rick Hoggard representing Post, 
11 Kirby. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
13 Let's start with some procedural issues first. 
14 This matter is set on the calendar for oral argument this 
15 morning and based upon my review of the history of this 
16 case, Mr. Moquin, I address this issue to you first, it 
17 appears to me that at this point, this Court has yet to sign 
18 an order resulting from this Court's, I believe it's the 
19 October 6th ruling of this Court wherein, by way of 
20 telephone—telephone conference call on the record, I 
21 rendered a decision. 
22 Since that date, I've noticed that what's been 
23 filed are a notice of objections to that ruling and a 
24 proposed order; there is a notice of the Utah Supreme Court 
25 ruling purportedly contrary to this Court's October 6th 
Page 385 
A P P E A R A N C E S (Continuing) 
For the Defendants: RICK B. HOGGARD 
Attorney at Law-
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-
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1 ruling; there's a—a request for a status conference looks 
2 like filed on November 1st; a second request for status 
3 conference, looks like it was filed on November 15th; and 
4 there's also a motion filed by you, I believe, that--
5 requesting that this Court act pursuant to order of the Utah 
6 Supreme Court. 
7 Those are the motions that I believe are the 
8 subject of this morning's hearing. Do you agree or disagree 
9 with that? 
10 MR. MOQUIN: i agree with that, your Honor, 
11 although I believe we considered the tele-conference 
12 satisfied our requirement for a status conference and this 
13 hearing is—is based on the October 25th hearing. 
14 THE COURT: rm not—I'm not sure I caught that. 
15 What satisfied the request for— 
16 MR. MOQUIN: Well, when you had the tele-
17 conference— 
18 THE COURT-. Okay. 
19 MR. MOQUIN: -scheduling this hearing today, 
20 because the status conference was after the decision was 
21 made by the Utah Supreme Court and we thought that before wi 
22 could proceed finalizing the order with Mr. Hoggard, that 
23 this issue would have to be addressed first and what—what 
24 affect the Utah Supreme Court's decision had on your order. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Hoggard, do you disagree that 
AI™ P smith rsT* rxon 266-0320 Page 1 - Page l 
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1 those are the matters before the Court this morning. 
2 MR.HOGGARD: No, that's correct, your Honor. The 
3 main issue is whatT s the effect of the Supreme Court1 s | 
4 order. 
5 THE COURT: You may go forward, Counsel. 
6 MR.MOQUIN: Thank you very much, 
7 THE COURT. And I should state to yon that I've 
8 reviewed all of the memoranda in support, opposition and in 
9 reply and so I'm not sure it's necessary that you simply 
10 regurgitate everything that you've already set forth, but I 
11 want—want you to have a full opportunity to assert your 
12 position. 
13 MR. MOQUIN: I will try not to be repetitive. 
14 Your Honor, the Utah Supreme Court's October 25th, 
15 2000 decision that a Rule 59 motion was pending in this case 
16 and thus, the appeal filed by David D. Bennett was 
17 premature, plaintiff, David D. Bennett requests the 
18 following action from the Court: A finding that the Rule 59 
j 19 motion was before this Court, a hearing on the Rule 59 
! 20 motion and alternatively, an effective denial of that Rule 
21 59 motion so David Bennett could proceed with his appeal 
22 without the Supreme Court finding that an appeal was 
23 premature. 
24 In his October 25th decision, Chief Justice 
25 Richard C. Howe, acting for the Supreme Court, was in 
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1 agreement with the arguments that counsel for Mr. Bennett 
2 made before this Court on October 2nd, 2000; in essence, the 
3 Utah Supreme Court necessarily decided that the pleading 
4 caption as a reply to defendants' response to plaintiffs 
5 objections of the minute entry and proposed order filed on 
6 February 16th, 2000, by Mr. Bennett was and is a Rule 59 
7 motion which not—which has not been decided. 
8 Plaintiff, Bennett, has provided this Court with 
9 the Utah Supreme Court order in Attachment 8 of this 
10 document entitled Attachments to (inaudible) in support of 
11 plaintiff s motion— 
12 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
13 MR. MOQUIN: -provided to all counsel. 
14 The Court clearly stated that if defendants' 
15 motion to dismiss this appeal is granted, plaintiff s notice 
\16 of appeal filed by Rule 59 motion was pending at the 
17 District Court was premature and this Court lacks 
18 jurisdiction. 
19 We don't believe that there were any 
20 qualifications to that, we don't think that—that because 
21 Mr. Bennett has alleged it was a Rule 59, we believe the 
22 Court has actually looked and made a decision. 
23 At—at the time— 
24 THE COURT: But that—true, that is what you 
25 believe to be your reasonable interpretation; is that a fan-
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1 statement? 
2 MR.MOQUIN: That's true and--
3 THE COURT: And—and setting aside your advocacy I 
4 role for a moment— 
5 MR. MOQUIN: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: - i f that's possible; hopefully, it's 
7 (inaudible) 
8 MR. MOQUIN: Yeah. Yes, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Are you suggesting to me that they | 
10 are—that an opposite opinion—that there are no—there can 
11 be no opposite reasonable interpretations of—of—of that 
12 order— 
13 MR.MOQUIN: So long— 
14 THE COURT: - o f dismissal? 
15 MR. MOQUIN: I think that there obviously could be 
16 another opinion, but I think you have to go through a lot 
17 o f -
18 THE COURT: Reas—reasonable opinion? 
19 MR.MOQUIN: Reasonable? Well, I'm not sure it 
20 would be reasonable. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MOQUIN: I mean, because I think that the 
23 Court was presented essentially with three options, two 
24 options were presented by Mr. Hoggard, that cither it was 
25 premature because it was late, filed after 30 days had run 
Page 8 
1 after the—the judgment; or it was premature because of the 
2 existence of Rule 59; but I think the Court had a third 
3 option, I think the Court could merely have accepted Mr. 
4 Hoggard1 s argument and said, well, this is either premature 
5 or it's late and we're not going to decide that issue right 
6 now. I think that was the third option the Court could have 
7 taken at that point, so I think it had three options and I 
8 think it made a conscious decision to choose one. And I 
9 think Mr. Hoggard invited the Court to choose one and as I 
10 go on, I'll explain that. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. MOQUIN: This Supreme Court decision is in 
13 complete agreement with existing case law. The reply was 
14 filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment; 
15 thus, under numerous controlling cases, for example, Reeves 
\16 vs. Steinfeld, 915 P.2d 1073, DeBry vs. Fidelity National 
17 Title Insurance, 828 P.2d 520-523, it should be ruled a Rule 
18 59 motion. Moreover, under Reagan vs. Bloundt and 
19 subsequent cases, it cannot be disposed of silently. 
20 Defendants and this Court's reliance on Morgan v. 
21 Morgan is~is misplaced. Morgan does not provide guidance 
22 in a Rule 59 case. It—it controls the disposal of 
23 objections under local Rules 4-504, not Rule 59 motions. 
24 There is no silent disposing of Rule 59 motions as there is 
25 in a 4-504 objections. 
Alan P. Smith, CSR (801) 266-0320 Page 5 - Page I 
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1 On the October 2nd hearing, this Court was very 
2 candid and we appreciated that, that it stated that its 
3 normal procedure is to put a little notation whenever it 
4 signs a Rule 59 motion in a case like this, when there is a 
5 Rule 59 motion and to say that itTs either to the objections 
6 or to say itf s ruled on either the objections or a Rule 59 
7 motion. 
8 I think in the—in—when you're deciding 
9 objections, that's optional. I think case law, Morgan v. 
10 Morgan stands for that, that that—that is optional; but on 
11 a Rule 59—in a Rule 59 situation, which we believe this is, 
12 under Reagan vs. Bloundt, that is not acceptable. There has 
13 to—there has to be that notation, it's not optional to 
14 write in, they're not (inaudible) 
15 And while this Court, we believe, thought it— 
16 believes it's considered the Rule 59 issues and—and decided 
17 against them, it did not do it in an effective manner. 
18 There are certain procedures that have to be followed and 
19 this Court did not follow those procedures. 
20 Though it's quite evident under the Utah case law 
21 that Mr. Bennett did file a Rule 59 motion which has not 
22 been properly addressed, the position is now, with all due 
23 respect to this Court, no longer this Court's to make. 
24 Under the law of the case doctrine, particularly the 
25 mandated rule branch, this Court must follow the Utah 
! Page 10 
1 Supreme Court's decision in this matter. 
2 Defendant, Post, Kirby and Michael Kirby, hereby 
3 referred to collectively as Post, Kirby, gave the Utah 
4 Supreme Court two alternative grounds to decide that 
5 plaintiff had filed an appeal on time, (inaudible) all 
6 relevant pleadings to make such a decision. This is amply 
7 demonstrated in a filing by Mr. Bennett before this Court 
8 entitled—and I won't repeat it again, I'll try to move this 
9 along. 
10 The Utah Supreme Court could have decided that no 
11 Rule 59 motion existed; instead, Chief Justice Howe, for the 
12 Court, decided that a Rule 59 motion was still outstanding 
13 on June 9th, 2000, which is contrary to this Court's 
14 hearing—holding. Under the mandated rule as expressed in 
15 Thurston vs. Box Elder County, this Court is obligated 
16 (inaudible) both the letter and the spirit of the mandate 
17 from the Utah Supreme Court. 
18 Post, Kirby, in his response to the plaintiffs 
19 motion that this Court act pursuant to the order of the Utah 
20 Supreme Court entered October 25th, 2000, attempts to argue 
21 that the order falls within an exception to the mandated 
22 rule either because it is dictum or no actual decision has 
23 been made; however, this is clearly a specious argument. 
24 The determination of whether a Rule 59 motion existed was 
25 critical to the Supreme Court order, thus, it clearly is not 
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1 dictum. 
2 Similarly, since the entire order is based on the 
3 existence of a timely, unaddressed Rule 59 motion, it is 
4 not—it is an unattenable position to argue that the Utah 
5 Supreme Court had—had not made a decision in this matter. 
6 Defendant, Post, Kirby, simply does not like the 
7 Utah Supreme Court's decision. Post, Kirby attempted to 
8 avoid an appeal of your Honor's decision by preemptively 
9 compelling the Utah Supreme Court to decide whether a Rule 
10 59 motion existed. Post, Kirby received what he wanted in a 
11 summary disposition. 
12 A decision on whether Mr. Bennett's appeal was 
13 premature or time barred, as the old adage goes, Be careful 
14 what you ask for. Fairness in Utah law dictates that Post, 
15 Kirby now has to abide by the Utah Supreme Court's decision. 
16 Post, Kirby has had its bite at the apple. Post, Kirby had 
17 its chance to argue before the Utah Supreme Court that Mr. 
18 Bennett's reply was not a Rule 59 motion, defendant had its 
19 chance to—to appeal the decision. 
20 It is now the Court's duty to decide the Rule 59 
21 motion so this case can move forward. The record is clear 
22 that Post, Kirby, in Attachment 3 of this document, 
23 Paragraph 11 in the statement of facts, in its appellee's 
24 mo—memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
25 disposition, informed the Court that it was—it was its 
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1 position that either no Rule 59 motion had been filed or it 
2 had been disposed of and this Court signed an identical 
3 order (inaudible) reply. 
4 Additionally, Post, Kirby submitted to the Court 
5 all relevant filings outlining this position. Clearly, the 
[ 6 Utah Supreme Court made a conscious choice between the two 
7 scenarios; thus, Post, Kirby's argument that the Court did 
8 not truly decide between the alternatives but somehow just 
9 accepted Mr. Bennett's argument is specious. 
10 After the earlier hearing and this Court's candid 
111 admissions, Mr. Bennett and his counsel, understand that 
12 this Court wanted to rule on the Rule 59 issues; 
13 nevertheless, this Court failed to follow the proper 
14 procedures to dispose of a Rule 59 motion, thus, it failed 
15 to dispose of the Rule 59 motion. 
16 The Utah Supreme Court, having all pertinent 
17 filings before it has now recognized the existence of a Rule 
18 59 motion. The Supreme Court order is concise and clear and 
19 once again, the order states, the defendants' motion to 
20 dismiss this appeal is granted. Plaintiffs notice of 
21 appeal filed while Rule 59 motion was pending it the 
22 District Court was premature and this Court lacks 
23 jurisdiction. If this was a case of statutory construction 
24 and I realize it isn't, the plain language of this would 
25 have to be followed. 
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1 And I—I would argue that just following the plain 
2 language of this—plain language of this order makes sense 
3 in this case because the issue of jurisdiction can always be 
4 raised. If we1 re given our Rule 50—if the Court recognizes 
5 the Rule 59 right, Rule 59 motion and we're allowed to file 
6 an appeal, Post, Kirby can raise this issue at the Supreme 
7 Court, this jurisdictional issue. And if this decision is 
8 wrong, it'll be corrected at that point but we will not have 
9 to go through the cost of appealing a Rule 59 issue and then 
10 if we're correct, having to file another appeal. 
11 So, I think that when you weigh the equities to 
12 just follow the court's decision and accept their language 
13 as meaning just what it states, it seems to me the fairest 
14 way to proceed. 
15 This Court should not be expected to read the mind 
16 of Chief Justice Howe. This Court should just follow the 
17 plain language of the order. 
18 In our filings, we tried to figure to what was 
19 going on in your mind and I think we failed miserably when 
j 20 we were trying to figure out, you know, which order you 
21 meant to sign and I think when you start, it's a very 
22 slippery slope to try to figure out that it—that Chief 
23 Justice Howe means something other than what he said or 
24 there's some limitations. And I think it's just that the 
25 cleanest way is to go with the language of Chief Justice 
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1 Howe. 
2 And finally, to wrap this up, this—this Court 
3 should treat the plaintiff's reply as a Rule 59 motion and 
4 act accordingly. Mr. Bennett and his counsel believe the 
5 Court would benefit from a full briefing of the RuK 
6 issues and particularly the Rule 54 aspects; however, we are 
7 primarily concerned with having our appeal rights 
8 recognized. The issue of jurisdiction should be the subject 
9 of appeal, not the issue of the timeliness of a Rule59 
10 motion. 
111 A decision by this Court contrary would only delay 
12 the resolution of the case that has already con—consumed 
13 too much judicial resources. 
14 Thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
16 This is really a minor point but I'm just curious. 
17 When you filed the request for the status conferences in 
18 November, were you aware of the fact that I was not in the 
19 State of Utah during those— 
20 MR. MOQUTN: No, I wasn't, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MOQUIN: i~i came in and I think the first 
23 time I—I was aware of that was in—in January, when I was 
24 in for another hearing and I found out that you wouldn't be 
25 available for—or in February. 
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1 THE COURT.- Okay. All right. 
2 MR. MOQUIN: Thank you. Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
4 MR. HOGGARD: Good morning, your Honor. 
5 The issue here is—is quite simple. We're looking 
6 at the application of the mandate rule to the October 25th 
7 order of the Supreme Court. And the parties will disagree 
8 on what the mandate order—rule is, where the Supreme Court 
9 has actually ruled on an issue, then this Court must follow 
10 that decision; however, to determine what was actually 
11 decided, you look at the opinion and the circumstances it 
12 embraces. And so it's not just, let's look at the language, 
13 we have to look at what the circumstances were to interpret 
14 what was really decided in the motion. 
15 Now, when you go back and look at the 
16 circumstances, it is clear that the rule—that the—the 
17 substantive issue of whether there was a Rule 59 motion 
18 pending was never addressed and never reached by the Supreme 
19 Court. 
20 Mr. Moquin cites various cases, talking about 
21 Reeves and Reagan and Morgan. The interesting thing, none 
22 of those cases were cited to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
23 only place that is found is in the attachments to Post, 
24 Kirby's motion where they're reciting the history in the 
25 statement of fact and attaches for the purpose of just 
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1 putting the record, we have the briefs attached to the 
2 motion. But nowhere in the argument section, nowhere in any 
3 of the briefs that were actually—the memorandum that were 
4 actually submitted to the Supreme Court for decision on the 
5 motions themselves or in opposition to the motions, 
i 6 discussed any of the substantive issues. What is a Rule 59 
7 motion and whether this Court necessarily denied that motion 
8 by implication when it signed the judgment. Those two 
9 issues are not in any of the arguments submitted to the Utah 
10 Supreme Court. 
11 All—you have to reach all the way to the briefs, 
12 which are background information, to one paragraph giving 
13 the history, the procedural history of the case, to even get 
14 any mention of the merits. 
15 So, what happened was, the docketing statement was 
16 filed by Mr. Bennett and Mr. Bennett said, It is our 
17 position that there is a Rule 59 motion still pending, but 
18 we filed this appeal under the alternate possibility that 
19 the Court did in fact rule upon the 59 motion in the 
20 February judgments. 
21 So, in the docketing statements, he says the 
22 appeal was based upon the assumption there was no Rule 59 
23 motion pending. So, we filed the motions—Post, Kirby filed 
24 a motion to dismiss which said, under that basis, which is 
25 based on the note—time for appeal starts under Rule 58(a) 
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1 due to the notice of judgment, we argued clearly Rule 58(a) 
2 undermines that position because it says failure to give 
3 notice of entry of judgment doesn't toll the time for 
4 appeal. 
5 So that if there is no pending Rule 59 motion, 
6 their appeal is clearly late. And then we say in the 
7 alternative, if—even if you were to—even if there were a 
8 motion pending, which they don't claim there is, based upon 
9 the appeal, then it's premature. Either way, it doesn't 
10 matter, you don't even have to reach the issue, either way, 
11 under either possible scenario of what the case is, the 
12 status of the case is, it's untimely, you dismiss it. 
13 Then, instead of responding to that motion, Mr. 
14 Bennett filed a motion to remand in which he abandoned his 
15 position in the docketing statement which was, okay, well, 
16 this appeal is based on the fact there is no Rule 59 motion 
17 pending. He then says in his motion to remand that the 
18 Court, this Court has failed to rule on the Rule 59 motion, 
19 therefore, the record is incomplete and the court, the 
20 Supreme Court should remand the issue to this Court to 
21 resolve the pending motions that were pending in May as to 
122 whether or not there was a Rule 59 motion pending back in 
23 February. 
24 So that that motion to remand changed the issue. 
25 The issue is now, okay, Mr. Bennett is asserting that there 
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1 is a Rule 59 motion pending; now, what do you do? Do you 
2 remand or do you dismiss under those circumstances? Well, 
3 it's absolutely clear under Utah Supreme Court precedent 
4 that if you are contest—if you are basing your appeal on 
5 the contention that there is in fact a Rule 59 motion 
6 pending, then your motion is pre—then your appeal is 
7 premature. 
8 So, the issue wasn't whether or not there's a Rule 
9 59 motion pending. Bennett is now saying there is, that's 
10 what he's basing his appeal on. The question is, what do 
11 you do? Do you appe—do you dismiss or do you remand? 
12 When we filed—when Mr.—when Post, Kirby filed 
13 its reply memorandum, it recognized, it told the Supreme 
14 Court, look, they changed their position so now what you've 
15 got to do is dismiss and we said, quote, This court must 
16 dismiss or terminate the pending appeal as untimely so as to 
17 remand the case to the District Court for resolution of any 
18 pending motions. And that was the main motion that was 
19 pending at the time. 
20 We never asked the Utah Supreme Court to reach the 
21 issue. Both Mr. Bennett and Post, Kirby told the Supreme— 
22 asked the Supreme Court, send the case back to the District 
23 Court to let the District Court decide whatever motions are 
24 pending because that's the posture of the case that's 
25 required at this time. So, no one argued the merits of the 
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1 Rule 59 issue and both parties said—asked the Court, send 
2 it back to the District Court to decide it in the first 
3 instance, that's who ought to decide these issues. And 
4 that's exactly what the court did. 
5 It then issued an order which simply says, motion 
6 is granted, filing an appeal where there's a pending Rule 59 | 
7 motion is premature and it cites a generic case on the fact 
8 that if you have a Rule 59 motion pending, you cannot 
9 appeal. The Utah Supreme Court doesn't cite the only case 
10 cited by Mr. Bennett on appeal on the merits, which is the 
11 DeBry case, the Supreme Court doesn't cite the Reeves or 
12 Reagan or Morgan cases, which are central to resolution of 
13 the underlying issue, it just cites a generic motion. 
14 So, it is Post, Kirby's position that when you 
15 look at the circumstances, all the Supreme Court was doing 
16 is saying, Mr. Bennett, you have to prove to us that there 
17 is jurisdiction on this appeal. You have now come to the 
18 Court and said there's a Rule 59 motion pending and you want 
19 us to remand. No, we dismiss. 
20 And Post, Kirby had already argued that if the 
21 other alternate possibility on which they initially asserted 
22 was clearly meritorious and they had abandoned that and so 
23 it's nothing more than sending the case back because on the 
24 asserted basis of jurisdiction that was asserted by Mr. 
25 Bennett, it was as a matter of law, absolutely certain that 
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1 their appeal was premature, was untimely. 
2 And so the Supreme Court—there's no indication 
3 they considered—considered the merits and the circumstances 
4 suggest the only issue before the Court was whether it would 
5 remand to this Court or dismiss. And on that basis, we 
6 believe that a mandate rule doesn't apply, the Court—this 
7 Court should enter an order encompassing its ruling on 
8 October 6 and to avoid additional economy problems, that in 
9 the order, it ought to say in the alternative, if the Utah 
10 Supreme Court finds, or it meant to change it, then I've 
11 denied it, because that's what this Court has already 
12 indicated. It's considered the issues and has denied the 
13 Rule 59 arguments. 
14 That way we have—we're—we're going on the 
15 primary issue, which is this Court has ruled there is no 
16 Rule 59 motion, but there's the fall-back position that in 
17 the event the Utah Supreme Court disagrees, we don't have to 
18 come back down and then go back up again, we can consider 
19 all those issues at the same time. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
21 Mr. Moquin? 
22 Mr. Barber? 
23 MR. BARBER: Your Honor, may I respond? 
24 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
25 MR. BARBER: Your Honor, it occurs to me that, 
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1 although, of course, a critical issue is the Supreme Court's 
2 order, but what is also important is the fundamental posture 
3 of the case on the record. And—and that is relevant in 
4 deciding whether or not the reply that Mr. Bennett filed on 
5 February 16th to the response to the objection to the entry 
6 of the minute entry granting judgment for the defendant— 
7 defendants Kirby, was in fact a Rule 59 motion. 
8 Because whether or not the Supreme Court's 
9 decision actually set forth a holding to that effect, we 
10 believe that the record under the circumstances makes it 
11 clear that that filing was a Rule 59 motion under applicable 
12 case law, primarily Reagan vs. Bloundt, because it 
13 challenged the substance of the Court's findings which were 
14 necessary to the entry of the judgment. 
15 We essentially asked for a new trial or a new 
16 judgment which is contemplated in the first paragraph of 
17 Rule 59 amongst the relief that the Court can grant in 
18 response to such a motion. What Mr. Bennett really asked 
19 the Court to do is to make a new judgment which was contrary 
20 to the one that the Court had indicated by minute entry that 
21 it intended to enter. 
122 It is also clear that this Court could not have 
23 ruled on that reply, whether or not a Rule 59 motion, when 
24 it signed the judgment in the first place because that reply 
25 hadn't even been filed. The only time the Court could have 
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1 impliedly denied the Rule 59 motion or whatever it was, was 
2 when it re-entered the judgment on the 28th of February; of 
3 course, nobody knew that that had happened—well, of course, 
4 the Court did, but counsel didn't. 
5 But as a result of that, we have kind of a flux 
6 state of facts that—that makes it difficult to ascertain— 
7 makes it difficult for us to ascertain as counsel and 
8 perhaps the Supreme Court, exactly what had happened in this 
9 Court to get the case where it was as it was presented to 
10 the Supreme Court. 
111 And I think their order is essentially an effort 
12 to short that out so that the records— 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Barber, it's—well, it's almost— 
14 sometimes it's a waste to me to put questions to counsel and 
15 I don't mean that in any negative way— 
16 MR. BARBER: No, no, I— 
17 THE COURT: -because what I'm usually going to 
18 get back is the advocative position. 
19 MR. BARBER: Of COUTSe. 
20 THE COURT: Of course. But it's just been my 
21 experience that the Supreme Court is—is usually far more 
22 explicit in circumstances of this nature than what they 
23 purport to be in the order dismissing the appeal. But 
24 there's no sense in me putting that question to you. 
25 MR. BARBER: Well, and—and-and I—I can't but 
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1 disagree—I can't disagree with you because the Supreme 
2 Court could have made it easier for us had they made a 
3 specific finding as part of their order and said as a 
4 predicate to the order we're now making, we are deciding 
5 that this is a Rule 59 motion that has to be dealt with. 
6 I think the error with counsel's argument, though, 
7 your Honor, is this: the notion that that is dictum or that 
8 it was just kind of a way to get rid of the case and get it 
9 back here for some undefined purpose is not well taken for 
10 the reason that the Supreme Court could not have dismissed 
11 the case without finding whether it constitutes a holding of 
12 the Court or not that it was a Rule 59 motion, they must 
13 have found that to be the case or you have to take the 
14 position that they decided the case upon an issue that is 
15 irrelevant. 
16 If this wasn't a Rule 59 motion, they had no basis 
17 to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that they did. So, I 
18 think that in the Supreme Court's order of dismissal, 
19 notwithstanding that it is not clear and concise and doesn't 
20 tell us exactly what they were thinking, there is a 
21 necessary finding that there was a Rule 59 motion pending 
22 and I think that the Court's sending it back here on that 
23 basis essentially says it would help us when we are dealing 
24 with this case if the District Court would make a ruling on 
25 that motion so we'll have something substantive to decide on 
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1 that issue. 
2 Without that hold—without a finding in this 
3 Court, a specific dealing with the Rule 59 motion, which is 
4 required under the rule, rather clearly,— 
5 THE COURT: But— 
6 MR. BARBER: -that Court doesn't know what it's 
7 doing either. 
8 THE COURT: i~i have made a ruling on that 
9 particular motion. It's just not—it has not yet been 
10 reduced to an order, I believe, that I have signed because 
11 of the objections filed in October, subsequent to the 
12 October 6th telephone conference call; isn't that correct? 
13 MR. BARBER: Yeah. And I don't have a problem, 
14 the only problem that I have with that is that without—and 
15 then what the Court did, as I recall it and please correct 
16 me if I'm wrong, but I think what the Court said on the 
17 October 6th and the—and the 29th phone conference was, 
18 look, I reviewed the record, I considered all the arguments, 
19 Bennett, that you made, and I rejected them. I intended to 
20 reject them and I do hereby again reject them. 
21 And had the Court entered a minute entry to that 
22 effect, then we would have had a ruling on the 59 motion. 
23 But-
24 THE COURT: You mean after— 
25 MR. BARBER.- -we still don't have one. 
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1 THE COURT: You mean after the October 6th 
2 telephone call? 
3 MR. BARBER: Yes . 
4 THE COURT: Well, I--didn't I--I instruct counsel 
5 to prepare an order, did I not? 
6 MR. BARBER: I think SO. 
7 THE COURT: You think so? You~you don't— 
8 MR. BARBER: Well, I~ 
9 THE COURT: i-do you—are you—you don't 
10 remember? 
11 MR. BARBER: Well, I don't have a specific 
12 recollection of that, but I'm sure the Court did that; but 
13 if that's the case, we're—we're satisfied. But that order 
14 ought to say at least whether or not this is a Rule 59 
15 motion, it's denied. Or whether or not it's a Rule59 
16 motion, it's granted. And then the record before the 
17 Supreme Court is clear. 
18 I think that one could explain the Court's 
19 decision by simply saying, well, they had to make a finding 
120 about that in order to dismiss the appeal; otherwise, the— 
21 the ruling makes no sense whatsoever. 
22 You—you can't say, well, somebody has said this 
23 is a Rule 59 motion, it's not but we're going to dismiss the 
24 appeal on the basis that we don't have jurisdiction to 
25 entertain an appeal when there's a 59 motion, if it isn't 
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1 one. There—there's no way they would have said that. 
2 So, I think they made a finding that for purposes 
3 of that appeal, the thing ought to be deemed to be a Rule 59 
4 motion and I think they dismissed the appeal contemplating 
5 that this Court, at some stage of the proceedings, would 
6 make a specific minute entry denying or granting the Rule 59 
7 motion. If you—of course, if you grant the Rule 59 motion, 
8 it doesn't go back to the Supreme Court at this stage and we 
9 can go ahead to trial; but if—if you deny the Rule 59 
10 motion, then there is a clear record to take to the Supreme 
11 Court, that that's what you've done, that you intended to do 
12 it and that you did do it in the manner that is required by 
13 the rules. 
114 And I think that's the problem. We just don't 
15 have a specific minute entry clearly required by the case 
16 law and the rules dealing with that motion. So, it seems to 
17 me that—that the thing's gotten a little bit out of hand 
18 with—with all the—the paper and time that we've had to 
19 spend with it in trying to get it settled; but it seems to 
20 me the sensible thing to do now is to simply enter an order 
21 denying the Rule 59 motion, whether you do that with a 
22 finding that it was a 59 motion or not, I don't know as 
23 particularly relevant, the Supreme Court can decide that. 
24 We think it clearly is 'cause it challenges the substance of 
25 what the Court found in its February 11th judgment and 
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1 therefore, put at issue all of the underlying predicates to 
2 the entry of that judgment and it therefore, must be deemed 
3 a 59 motion. 
4 But whether you specifically say, well, it's a 59 
5 motion or it isn't, if you'll deny it, then we can go to the 
6 Court and say, well, you're wrong about that. Or Mr. 
7 Hoggard can go up there and say you were damn right to do 
8 that. But without a specific ruling that comports with the 
9 requirements of the case law, we still have a kind of a—an 
10 unclear record where we don't know quite what the Supreme 
11 Court was thinking when it re—when it dismissed the appeal 
12 and the Supreme Court itself may not know quite what you 
13 intended to do, not on October 6th, but on February 11th and 
14 then once again on February 28th, when you re-entered the 
15 same judgment. 
16 So, all we're saying and I—when you make it 
17 effective, I—you know, I mean, that order is effective when 
18 it's signed and frankly, that's going to help Bennett 
19 because we now have 30 days to appeal that judgment. And 
20 really, if you get right down to it, that's all we've been 
21 seeking since May 6th when we received notice of the entry 
22 of the judgment, is an opportunity to appeal the underlying 
23 findings that the Court had to make in order to grant the 
24 defendants' motion. 
25 And so it seems to me that it's fairly simple and 
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1 straightforward to do that, that it's more than warranted by 
2 the case law and that a clear order dealing with the Rule 59 
3 motion, assuming that that's what it is, is the easy way to 
4 get the matter in a resolve—get the matter resolved in a 
5 manner that is consistent with an orderly record to present 
6 to the Supreme Court. And that's what we'd ask the Court to 
7 do. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Barber. 
9 MR. BARBER: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Now, this is what I—this is what I'm 
11 going to do. I'm going to draft an order, myself, resulting 
12 from this hearing and I'll have that order to you within one 
13 week from today. 
14 I can't recall if your—if you have fax numbers on 
15 your pleadings or not, but I'll fax a copy to you as well as 
16 mail a copy to you; of course, the original will be in the 
17 file. If you don't have the fax numbers on your pleadings, 
18 make sure you give them to Tina so that she has those. 
19 Anything else at this point, Counsel? 
20 MR. HOGGARD: No, VOUT Honor. 
21 THE COURT-. Mr. Barber? 
22 MR. BARBER: No, VOUT Honor. 
23 THE COURT: No? Okay. We'll recess at this 
24 point. 
25 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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